Luke, this is my first comment on LessWrong so forgive me if I’m missing some of the zeitgeist. But I was wondering if you could elaborate on a couple points:
You recommend replacing ethics with moral psychology and decision theory. Hearing that, I’m concerned that replacing ethics with moral psychology would be falling for a naive is/ought fallacy: just because most people’s psychological makeup makes them consider morality in a certain way does not make those moral intuitions correct. And replacing ethics with decision theory would be sidestepping the metaethical question about the legitimacy of consequentialism.
You’ve also left out any political theory from your syllabus. That is disappointing, since one of the roles that philosophy plays when performing at its best is uniting epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy. Plato and Kant, for example, were attempting to do that. How do you see your curriculum weighing in on questions like “What is justice?”
As for my background, I studied cognitive science as an undergraduate with a focus on complexity theory and artificial intelligence, but have also spent a lot of time reading and discussing other philosophy. While I think I understand the thrust of your argument (it’s one I would have made myself when I was an undergrad), I’ve been since convinced of the value of other schools of thought.
I’d argue that, say, continental philosophers are not as sloppy as computer scientists or analytically trained philosophers accuse them of. Rather they have a specialized vocabulary (just like other specialists) for some very difficult but powerful concepts. Often these concepts pertain to social and political life. These concepts aren’t easily reducible to a naturalized cognitivist wordview because they deal with transpersonal phenomena. That doesn’t mean they lack utility though.
I’m concerned that replacing ethics with moral psychology would be falling for a naive is/ought fallacy: just because most people’s psychological makeup makes them consider morality in a certain way does not make those moral intuitions correct.
I don’t think Luke would disagree with this statement. The point of learning moral psychology, as I understand it, is not to adopt moral psychology as moral philosophy; it’s to understand where moral intuitions come from. Luke doesn’t want philosophers studying intuitionist moral philosophy, as I understand it, because it doesn’t provide an accurate account of how people actually make moral decisions in practice.
You’ve also left out any political theory from your syllabus.
My understanding is that there is a standing agreement on LW not to discuss politics; see the Politics is the Mind-Killer sequence.
These concepts aren’t easily reducible to a naturalized cognitivist wordview because they deal with transpersonal phenomena.
Can you elaborate on what you mean by this? (I am not sure exactly what you mean by “a naturalized cognitivist worldview” or by “transpersonal phenomena.”)
I don’t think Luke would disagree with this statement. The point of learning moral psychology, as I understand it, is not to adopt moral psychology as moral philosophy; it’s to understand where moral intuitions come from. Luke doesn’t want philosophers studying intuitionist moral philosophy, as I understand it, because it doesn’t provide an accurate account of how people actually make moral decisions in practice.
Thank you for the clarification.
Where I still take issue is that even if we know, generally speaking, “how people actually make moral decisions in practice”, or “where moral intuitions come from,” that does not add up to what a philosophical study of ethics is supposed to give us, which is more like: what moral decisions people ought to make, or, how people’s moral intuitions ought to be refined (through argumentation, say).
To put it another way, if study of ethics changes the way one makes moral decisions, then the ethically educated would act in an abnormal ethical practice. (If study does not change the way one makes moral decisions, it’s not clear why it would matter at all how people are taught moral philosophy).
My understanding is that there is a standing agreement on LW not to discuss politics; see the Politics is the Mind-Killer sequence.
That is very interesting to know. But I don’t understand your implication. I thought we were talking about a potential revision of the philosophical curriculum. Are you suggesting that mentioning that political theory is part of philosophy is against the ‘agreement on LW’ and so should not be discussed? Or that Luke has chosen not to bring up this aspect of philosophy so as to avoid bringing up politics?
Can you elaborate on what you mean by this? (I am not sure exactly what you mean by “a naturalized cognitivist worldview” or by “transpersonal phenomena.”)
By ‘naturalized cognitivist worldview’ I mean the worldview that holds all the pertinent phenomena to be ‘natural’ in the sense of being discernable by physical sciences, with an emphasis on those phenomena that are part of cognitive systems. Often this comes with the idea that the most pertinent unit of analysis when studying society is the individual cognitive agent or internal processes therein.
I don’t mean anything specific by ‘transpersonal phenomena,’ but I guess I’m trying to broadly indicate phenomena that are not bounded to an individual’s cognitive apparatus. One such phenomena might be Kant’s own idea of trancendental reason. Another could be Taylor’s concept of the social imaginary).
Where I still take issue is that even if we know, generally speaking, “how people actually make moral decisions in practice”, or “where moral intuitions come from,” that does not add up to what a philosophical study of ethics is supposed to give us, which is more like: what moral decisions people ought to make, or, how people’s moral intuitions ought to be refined (through argumentation, say).
I don’t think Luke would disagree with this statement either. That’s why the replacement for intuitionist moral philosophy isn’t just moral psychology, it’s “moral psychology, decision theory, and game theory.” You seem to be reading more into Luke’s suggestions than is there.
Are you suggesting that mentioning that political theory is part of philosophy is against the ‘agreement on LW’ and so should not be discussed? Or that Luke has chosen not to bring up this aspect of philosophy so as to avoid bringing up politics?
Probably the latter. It might be worth mentioning that the philosophical interests of many LWers are aimed towards artificial intelligence, and in some scenarios where the kind of philosophizing that LW people do would pay off, political theory seems irrelevant (a singleton, for example), or at least is much less relevant than a theory of ethics precise enough that you can code it into an artificial intelligence.
By ‘naturalized cognitivist worldview’ I mean the worldview that holds all the pertinent phenomena to be ‘natural’ in the sense of being discernable by physical sciences, with an emphasis on those phenomena that are part of cognitive systems. Often this comes with the idea that the most pertinent unit of analysis when studying society is the individual cognitive agent or internal processes therein.
I don’t see what the latter has to do with the former. As you say, the latter point of view doesn’t seem well-suited to understanding society at large. That has nothing to do with the validity of the former point of view (which I assume is being held in opposition to worldviews that allow epiphenomena).
I don’t mean anything specific by ‘transpersonal phenomena,’ but I guess I’m trying to broadly indicate phenomena that are not bounded to an individual’s cognitive apparatus.
I don’t see why this isn’t reducible to a naturalized cognitivist worldview. Instead of one mind you study a collection of minds.
That’s why the replacement for intuitionist moral philosophy isn’t just moral psychology, it’s “moral psychology, decision theory, and game theory.” You seem to be reading more into Luke’s suggestions than is there.
I addressed decision theory in my original comment. “And replacing ethics with decision theory would be sidestepping the metaethical question about the legitimacy of consequentialism.”
I think that the replacement would implicitly make a few ethical and metaethical assumptions that are a matter of legitimate debate within academic philosophy.
Or that Luke has chosen not to bring up this aspect of philosophy so as to avoid bringing up politics?
Probably the latter. … political theory seems irrelevant
Ah, I see. While I think I understand Luke’s adherence to LW’s norms and interests, I think it would be very narrow-minded to think that the interests of society as a whole or the academic system in particular share the focus of LW.
As long as Luke is addressing what he sees as problems with the curriculum of philosophy departments (which is itself a rather political issue, really), wouldn’t it be irrational to ignore the real context in which philosophy occurs (a sociopolitical one)?
I don’t see what the latter has to do with the former. As you say, the latter point of view doesn’t seem well-suited to understanding society at large.
I agree. I was just indicating a common association.
That has nothing to do with the validity of the former point of view (which I assume is being held in opposition to worldviews that allow epiphenomena).
The validity of the former point of view tends to be challenged by those with either phenomenological or social constructivist orientations. (I am not sure whether these positions ‘allow epiphenomena’ or not; I expect that when taken to their logical conclusion, they don’t, but that they are coreducible with the cognitivist naturalist view)
I don’t see why this isn’t reducible to a naturalized cognitivist worldview. Instead of one mind you study a collection of minds.
I fundamentally agree. However, though I think that these can in principle be reduced to a naturalized cognitivist view (or, we could say, ontology), that doesn’t mean that this can be done easily, or that that reduction will necessarily get us farther or faster than a different level of analysis.
Because of the difficulty of that reduction and the possible intractability of the social theories in their reduced form, it makes sense to continue inquiry on a social or political level. This level of analysis often evokes philosophical concepts that are not in Luke’s curriculum.
Do you know the author of that page? If you do, could you try convincing them to include more examples to constrain the interpretation of their abstractions? They seem to have interesting ideas, but my understanding of them currently depends heavily on charitable-interpretation-giving rather than actual confidence that the author has a correct and well-calibrated ideas in mind...
Anyway, I’ve seen certain LWers hypothesize/claim/point out that in our culture it is taboo to talk about certain intersubjective truths too explicitly. See, for example, this and the comment thread to it.
Luke, this is my first comment on LessWrong so forgive me if I’m missing some of the zeitgeist. But I was wondering if you could elaborate on a couple points:
You recommend replacing ethics with moral psychology and decision theory. Hearing that, I’m concerned that replacing ethics with moral psychology would be falling for a naive is/ought fallacy: just because most people’s psychological makeup makes them consider morality in a certain way does not make those moral intuitions correct. And replacing ethics with decision theory would be sidestepping the metaethical question about the legitimacy of consequentialism.
You’ve also left out any political theory from your syllabus. That is disappointing, since one of the roles that philosophy plays when performing at its best is uniting epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy. Plato and Kant, for example, were attempting to do that. How do you see your curriculum weighing in on questions like “What is justice?”
As for my background, I studied cognitive science as an undergraduate with a focus on complexity theory and artificial intelligence, but have also spent a lot of time reading and discussing other philosophy. While I think I understand the thrust of your argument (it’s one I would have made myself when I was an undergrad), I’ve been since convinced of the value of other schools of thought.
I’d argue that, say, continental philosophers are not as sloppy as computer scientists or analytically trained philosophers accuse them of. Rather they have a specialized vocabulary (just like other specialists) for some very difficult but powerful concepts. Often these concepts pertain to social and political life. These concepts aren’t easily reducible to a naturalized cognitivist wordview because they deal with transpersonal phenomena. That doesn’t mean they lack utility though.
I don’t think Luke would disagree with this statement. The point of learning moral psychology, as I understand it, is not to adopt moral psychology as moral philosophy; it’s to understand where moral intuitions come from. Luke doesn’t want philosophers studying intuitionist moral philosophy, as I understand it, because it doesn’t provide an accurate account of how people actually make moral decisions in practice.
My understanding is that there is a standing agreement on LW not to discuss politics; see the Politics is the Mind-Killer sequence.
Can you elaborate on what you mean by this? (I am not sure exactly what you mean by “a naturalized cognitivist worldview” or by “transpersonal phenomena.”)
Thank you for this reply.
Thank you for the clarification.
Where I still take issue is that even if we know, generally speaking, “how people actually make moral decisions in practice”, or “where moral intuitions come from,” that does not add up to what a philosophical study of ethics is supposed to give us, which is more like: what moral decisions people ought to make, or, how people’s moral intuitions ought to be refined (through argumentation, say).
To put it another way, if study of ethics changes the way one makes moral decisions, then the ethically educated would act in an abnormal ethical practice. (If study does not change the way one makes moral decisions, it’s not clear why it would matter at all how people are taught moral philosophy).
That is very interesting to know. But I don’t understand your implication. I thought we were talking about a potential revision of the philosophical curriculum. Are you suggesting that mentioning that political theory is part of philosophy is against the ‘agreement on LW’ and so should not be discussed? Or that Luke has chosen not to bring up this aspect of philosophy so as to avoid bringing up politics?
By ‘naturalized cognitivist worldview’ I mean the worldview that holds all the pertinent phenomena to be ‘natural’ in the sense of being discernable by physical sciences, with an emphasis on those phenomena that are part of cognitive systems. Often this comes with the idea that the most pertinent unit of analysis when studying society is the individual cognitive agent or internal processes therein.
I don’t mean anything specific by ‘transpersonal phenomena,’ but I guess I’m trying to broadly indicate phenomena that are not bounded to an individual’s cognitive apparatus. One such phenomena might be Kant’s own idea of trancendental reason. Another could be Taylor’s concept of the social imaginary).
I don’t think Luke would disagree with this statement either. That’s why the replacement for intuitionist moral philosophy isn’t just moral psychology, it’s “moral psychology, decision theory, and game theory.” You seem to be reading more into Luke’s suggestions than is there.
Probably the latter. It might be worth mentioning that the philosophical interests of many LWers are aimed towards artificial intelligence, and in some scenarios where the kind of philosophizing that LW people do would pay off, political theory seems irrelevant (a singleton, for example), or at least is much less relevant than a theory of ethics precise enough that you can code it into an artificial intelligence.
I don’t see what the latter has to do with the former. As you say, the latter point of view doesn’t seem well-suited to understanding society at large. That has nothing to do with the validity of the former point of view (which I assume is being held in opposition to worldviews that allow epiphenomena).
I don’t see why this isn’t reducible to a naturalized cognitivist worldview. Instead of one mind you study a collection of minds.
I addressed decision theory in my original comment. “And replacing ethics with decision theory would be sidestepping the metaethical question about the legitimacy of consequentialism.”
I think that the replacement would implicitly make a few ethical and metaethical assumptions that are a matter of legitimate debate within academic philosophy.
Ah, I see. While I think I understand Luke’s adherence to LW’s norms and interests, I think it would be very narrow-minded to think that the interests of society as a whole or the academic system in particular share the focus of LW.
As long as Luke is addressing what he sees as problems with the curriculum of philosophy departments (which is itself a rather political issue, really), wouldn’t it be irrational to ignore the real context in which philosophy occurs (a sociopolitical one)?
I agree. I was just indicating a common association.
The validity of the former point of view tends to be challenged by those with either phenomenological or social constructivist orientations. (I am not sure whether these positions ‘allow epiphenomena’ or not; I expect that when taken to their logical conclusion, they don’t, but that they are coreducible with the cognitivist naturalist view)
I fundamentally agree. However, though I think that these can in principle be reduced to a naturalized cognitivist view (or, we could say, ontology), that doesn’t mean that this can be done easily, or that that reduction will necessarily get us farther or faster than a different level of analysis.
Because of the difficulty of that reduction and the possible intractability of the social theories in their reduced form, it makes sense to continue inquiry on a social or political level. This level of analysis often evokes philosophical concepts that are not in Luke’s curriculum.
I guess something like this.
Do you know the author of that page? If you do, could you try convincing them to include more examples to constrain the interpretation of their abstractions? They seem to have interesting ideas, but my understanding of them currently depends heavily on charitable-interpretation-giving rather than actual confidence that the author has a correct and well-calibrated ideas in mind...
I don’t. I saw that page linked to from here.
Anyway, I’ve seen certain LWers hypothesize/claim/point out that in our culture it is taboo to talk about certain intersubjective truths too explicitly. See, for example, this and the comment thread to it.