Forgive me if someone else has made this rather obvious remark (too many comments to wade through), but isn’t it a weird irony to rely on the big generalization that “[h]itherto the people attracted to philosophy have been mostly those who loved the big generalizations, which were all wrong?”
You give the impression of someone who has not begun to understand basic, perennial philosophical problems. To illustrate, consider the following questions that are dealt with explicitly (and incredibly well) by philosophers throughout the tradition, but not derivable at all from any scientific discovery:
What is the nature of the ontological difference between being qua being and particular beings? Perhaps you think this is a pseudo-problem, yet we all think we can meaningfully say that different things are in (maybe) the same way and the same respect. In what sense is it legitimate to do this?
What is the best metaphor we can use to describe what is going on when we say something is “true”?
What is the Good?
The presuppositions that underlie this blog post are questionable for many reasons, but they are especially so because you go out of your way to ridicule the only mode of inquiry that is capable of calling them into question: namely, philosophical inquiry.
isn’t it a weird irony to rely on the big generalization that “[h]itherto the people attracted to philosophy have been mostly those who loved the big generalizations, which were all wrong?”
Yes, you caught the irony. Of course, not all ironic statements are false. There are in fact true generalizations about overgeneralization.
There are indeed questions to which philosophers have given insightful answers. But I feel embarrassed on behalf of philosophers to see such pseudo-questions paraded as their proudest accomplishments. Being is univocal because quantification is univocal; we don’t mean different things by ‘are’ or ‘two’ or ‘all’ in different contexts. The best metaphor for truth will depend on our goals. ‘The Good’ and ‘Being’ are ambiguous terms, so the question as to their intended sense will need to be clarified before it can be fruitfully pursued. See Peter van Inwagen’s Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment.
(Since I’m citing a philosopher, you know I agree with you to some extent. I just don’t like treating Philosophy as a tribe to be defended. Especially not Bad Philosophy. If philosophy is anything worth preserving, it’s just a toolbox.)
Thanks! My post on how to improve science (in a few ways, at least) is How to Fix Science.
Forgive me if someone else has made this rather obvious remark (too many comments to wade through), but isn’t it a weird irony to rely on the big generalization that “[h]itherto the people attracted to philosophy have been mostly those who loved the big generalizations, which were all wrong?”
You give the impression of someone who has not begun to understand basic, perennial philosophical problems. To illustrate, consider the following questions that are dealt with explicitly (and incredibly well) by philosophers throughout the tradition, but not derivable at all from any scientific discovery:
What is the nature of the ontological difference between being qua being and particular beings? Perhaps you think this is a pseudo-problem, yet we all think we can meaningfully say that different things are in (maybe) the same way and the same respect. In what sense is it legitimate to do this?
What is the best metaphor we can use to describe what is going on when we say something is “true”?
What is the Good?
The presuppositions that underlie this blog post are questionable for many reasons, but they are especially so because you go out of your way to ridicule the only mode of inquiry that is capable of calling them into question: namely, philosophical inquiry.
Yes, you caught the irony. Of course, not all ironic statements are false. There are in fact true generalizations about overgeneralization.
There are indeed questions to which philosophers have given insightful answers. But I feel embarrassed on behalf of philosophers to see such pseudo-questions paraded as their proudest accomplishments. Being is univocal because quantification is univocal; we don’t mean different things by ‘are’ or ‘two’ or ‘all’ in different contexts. The best metaphor for truth will depend on our goals. ‘The Good’ and ‘Being’ are ambiguous terms, so the question as to their intended sense will need to be clarified before it can be fruitfully pursued. See Peter van Inwagen’s Being, Existence, and Ontological Commitment.
(Since I’m citing a philosopher, you know I agree with you to some extent. I just don’t like treating Philosophy as a tribe to be defended. Especially not Bad Philosophy. If philosophy is anything worth preserving, it’s just a toolbox.)