Ever since Gettier’s 1963 paper, this has not been taught except as a useful extremely close approximation of the correct definition. Since philosophers (and some linguists) are the ones who have been criticizing this heuristic, and since their criticisms concern very special cases of ‘epistemic luck,’ this is a doubly misleading charge. The standards philosophers are adopting when they doubt that knowledge is justified true belief are actually, in most contexts and for most everyday purposes, unreasonably high; dictionaries and classrooms almost invariably define terms in more approximate, inexact, and exception-allowing ways than do philosophers. (Indeed, this is why philosophers are often criticized for being too precise and ‘nitpicky’ in their terminological distinctions.)
propositions
I agree philosophers take the reality of propositions too seriously. However, mathematicians do precisely the same thing. In both cases it’s not that the doctrine is “definitely known to be wrong;” it’s that there’s no good reason to affirm causally inert abstracta.
Man is naturally good, but rich people made a contract which started a bad nature. Rousseau
This is not Rousseau’s view, and is not generally taught as fact by philosophers.
Man is naturally mean, but an abstract entity made itself as of the creation of a social contract (implicit or explicit) and that is what prevents evil from spreading. Hobbes. /
This is not Hobbes’ view, and is not generally taught as fact by philosophers.
Angels are separated by 72 Kilometers each in the heavens. Aquinas. /
This is theology, not philosophy. And even if you deem it philosophy, it’s not generally taught as fact by philosophers. (Including Christian philosophers.)
That of which nothing greater can be thought is smaller …
That is not Anselm’s argument, and Anselm’s actual argument is not considered by philosophers (even Christian philosophers) to be sound, as originally formulated.
Quite
It is not clear that JTB is jut plumb wrong, post Gettier, and in case it is hardly a charge against philosophy, when philosophy noticed the problem. If Diego has a better answer , I would like to hear it. Science types like to announce that “knowledge is information”, but that is inferior to JTB, because the requirement for truth has gone missing.
I agree philosophers take the reality of propositions too seriously.
I don’t particularly. Think this could be a case of taking a /facon de parler/ as an ontological commitment, cf PWs.
That is not Anselm’s argument, and Anselm’s actual argument is not considered by philosophers (even Christian philosophers) to be sound, as originally formulated.
I believe Platinga has tried to revive it, but that is considered a novelty.
I don’t particularly. Think this could be a case of taking a /facon de parler/ as an ontological commitment, cf PWs.
It’s true that some people treat ‘possible worlds’ and/or ‘propositions’ as mere eliminable manners of speech. But a lot of prominent philosophers also treat one or the other as metaphysically deep and important, as a base for reducing other things to a unified foundation rather than as a thing to be reduced in its own right. Philosophy as a whole deserves at least some criticism for taking such views seriously, for the same reason mathematics deserves criticism for taking mathematical platonism seriously.
And to clarify, the target of my criticism isn’t modal realism; modal realism is a straw-man almost everywhere outside the pages of a David Lewis article. Modal realism is the doctrine that possibilia are concrete and real; I’m criticizing the doctrine that possibilia (or propositions, or mathematical entities...) are abstract and real.
I believe Platinga has tried to revive it, but that is considered a novelty.
Lots of people, from Descartes onward, have given variations on ‘ontological’ arguments. But that Anselm’s original argument is fallacious (specifically, equivocal) is beyond reasonable doubt.
Ever since Gettier’s 1963 paper, this has not been taught except as a useful extremely close approximation of the correct definition. Since philosophers (and some linguists) are the ones who have been criticizing this heuristic, and since their criticisms concern very special cases of ‘epistemic luck,’ this is a doubly misleading charge. The standards philosophers are adopting when they doubt that knowledge is justified true belief are actually, in most contexts and for most everyday purposes, unreasonably high; dictionaries and classrooms almost invariably define terms in more approximate, inexact, and exception-allowing ways than do philosophers. (Indeed, this is why philosophers are often criticized for being too precise and ‘nitpicky’ in their terminological distinctions.)
I agree philosophers take the reality of propositions too seriously. However, mathematicians do precisely the same thing. In both cases it’s not that the doctrine is “definitely known to be wrong;” it’s that there’s no good reason to affirm causally inert abstracta.
This is not Rousseau’s view, and is not generally taught as fact by philosophers.
This is not Hobbes’ view, and is not generally taught as fact by philosophers.
This is theology, not philosophy. And even if you deem it philosophy, it’s not generally taught as fact by philosophers. (Including Christian philosophers.)
That is not Anselm’s argument, and Anselm’s actual argument is not considered by philosophers (even Christian philosophers) to be sound, as originally formulated.
Quite It is not clear that JTB is jut plumb wrong, post Gettier, and in case it is hardly a charge against philosophy, when philosophy noticed the problem. If Diego has a better answer , I would like to hear it. Science types like to announce that “knowledge is information”, but that is inferior to JTB, because the requirement for truth has gone missing.
I don’t particularly. Think this could be a case of taking a /facon de parler/ as an ontological commitment, cf PWs.
I believe Platinga has tried to revive it, but that is considered a novelty.
It’s true that some people treat ‘possible worlds’ and/or ‘propositions’ as mere eliminable manners of speech. But a lot of prominent philosophers also treat one or the other as metaphysically deep and important, as a base for reducing other things to a unified foundation rather than as a thing to be reduced in its own right. Philosophy as a whole deserves at least some criticism for taking such views seriously, for the same reason mathematics deserves criticism for taking mathematical platonism seriously.
And to clarify, the target of my criticism isn’t modal realism; modal realism is a straw-man almost everywhere outside the pages of a David Lewis article. Modal realism is the doctrine that possibilia are concrete and real; I’m criticizing the doctrine that possibilia (or propositions, or mathematical entities...) are abstract and real.
Lots of people, from Descartes onward, have given variations on ‘ontological’ arguments. But that Anselm’s original argument is fallacious (specifically, equivocal) is beyond reasonable doubt.