I’m using a kind fo functional role analysis: the role of morality is to regulate the behaviour of each individual to account for the preferences of others. That isn’t an intuition in the sense of “men kissing - yeuch!”
The intuition of “men kissing—yeuch!” is superseded by other intuitions. There’s a whole sequence on metaethics, you know. And you haven’t answered my question.
You have first-order moral intuitions, yes, and you have intuitions about how to resolve contradictions between these intuitions. Yes? That’s how everyone acquires knowledge of morality. do you have some other method of acquiring such knowledge?
I only have “intuitions about how to resolve contradictions” inasmuch as rationality in general has an intutive basis. If there is a problem of comparing intuitions against intutions in (meta)ethics, there is a similar problem in rationality.
Indeed. I had already noticed I was talking nonsense and retracted the comment by the time I recieved this. Sorry. I have now given an actual, non-stupid reply here.
How do you identify morality without simply comparing it to your own intuitions?
I’m using a kind fo functional role analysis: the role of morality is to regulate the behaviour of each individual to account for the preferences of others. That isn’t an intuition in the sense of “men kissing - yeuch!”
The intuition of “men kissing—yeuch!” is superseded by other intuitions. There’s a whole sequence on metaethics, you know. And you haven’t answered my question.
Says who? In my theory? In EY’s theory? Why should I care?
I know. I don’t find it very persuasive or cogent.
Yes I have. I identify morality by performing a functional role analysis and seeing whether candidates fit the funtional role.
You have first-order moral intuitions, yes, and you have intuitions about how to resolve contradictions between these intuitions. Yes? That’s how everyone acquires knowledge of morality. do you have some other method of acquiring such knowledge?
I only have “intuitions about how to resolve contradictions” inasmuch as rationality in general has an intutive basis. If there is a problem of comparing intuitions against intutions in (meta)ethics, there is a similar problem in rationality.
Could you describe a moral belief you changed in the past? For the purposes of an example.
It’s an intuition in the sense of “killing=bad”.
What I said was not an intution in the sense of killing=bad, because
a) it’s not an intiution. It’s a functional role anaysis
b) It’s metaethical (what kind of thing morality is) not first-order ethical (what is wrong)
Indeed. I had already noticed I was talking nonsense and retracted the comment by the time I recieved this. Sorry. I have now given an actual, non-stupid reply here.