Hmm, I can’t see any obvious utilitarian approach under which a cannibal society would be justified.
First, it would have to be a non-human society, or a society where humans had been substantially modified to remove their revulsion at eating other humans.
Second, under total utilitarian logic, it looks like there could be more people sustained on a bare subsistence diet (all of them with lives barely worth living) than could be sustained by breeding one bunch of humans to be consumed by other humans. So total utilitarians should reject the cannibal society: ironically, it may not be repugnant enough for the Repugnant Conclusion to hold! Under the same “repugnant” logic, total utilitarians would abolish meat eating and eradicate wild animals, whenever that led to an increase in the human population.
Average utilitarians would also reject the cannibal society, since they could improve the welfare of an average human by just not breeding the cannibal victims. It’s less clear to me what average utilitarians should do about farm animals and wildlife. This depends on whether these animals are included in the average at equal weight with humans, or whether there are different weighting factors. If equal weighting, then eradicating all non-human animal life would increase the average welfare of what’s left. This is another sort of repugnant conclusion of course.
However, none of these is the strongest reason for rejecting a cannibal scenario. The strongest reason appears to be the Kantian one: it’s wrong to treat human beings as means to an end. Whereas there seems to be no similar Kantian injunction against treating animals as means to an end.
It’s interesting that there is this asymmetry, which does initially look like outright speciesism. However, the crucial asymmetry is probably between agents who can be expected to be bound by a shared set of moral rules (including the rule of not using each other) and other beings who are not and cannot be bound by the same rules. If there were non-human animals, with whom we could agree to share a moral code, then the code could say it is wrong to use them as means to an end as well.
First, it would have to be a non-human society, or a society where humans had been substantially modified to remove their revulsion at eating other humans.
Humans have no general aversion to eating other humans. Same as they have no general aversion to killing other humans. Their were enough societies that routinely ate killed enemies. Humans do have aversion to killing and eating anyone/anything the feel empathy for. But whom you feel empathy for is strongly socialized. Sure empathy with children is strong but children of enemies were also often killed.
Don’t commit the ‘typical society fallacy’ of projecting and generalizing your (societies) values. Our society exists because it is more stable and competitive than tribal societies which played a less efficient competitive game. This means that a having humane values is a winning strategy for a society. But it is not ‘right’. It is just ethical.
Otherwise I basically agree with the utilitarian reasoning. Note that utilitarianism isn’t neccessarily the only possible approach.
Humans have no general aversion to eating other humans.
That is not true because cannibalism is rare. Moreover, many cases of cannibalism are ritual and symbolic.
they have no general aversion to killing other humans.
That is not true either. Being psychopathic is not a human norm. Clearly, humans can and do kill other humans when they feel the need for it, but “aversion” is a very weak work. I have no problem saying that humans do have a general aversion to killing other humans and that they manage to overcome that aversion rather easily.
Agreed. Rare it is. But then you agree that it does occur voluntary in normal healthy adult humans.
Moreover, many cases of cannibalism are ritual and symbolic.
That only qualifies it but doesn’t exclude it. In the opposite it means that it can be sufficiently ‘normal’ to have become part of tradition and customs.
Being psychopathic is not a human norm.
That has nothing to do with psychosis. It just means that killing other people can be quite nomal for human tribes.
I recommend having a look at the Yanomamö:
The range of behavior that historically has occurred “voluntary in normal healthy adult humans” is very very wide.
Indeed. That is exactly the point.
Not psychosis but psychopathy.
That’s what I meant. My fingers just typed something differnt.
I stand by my assertion in the parent post.
Which one exactly?
Humans have no general aversion to eating other humans.
The point is that killing/eating other humans/animals is nothing special. It is part of human behavior in so far as it is no outlier or random/accidental (mis)behavior but in the normal action continuum well integrated with suitable affects moderating it. That is the reason why it can be socially moderated/ritualized/tabooed.
And this doesn’t say anything about large-society-ethics. But large-society-ethics has to consider this part of human wiring/complex utility function.
I also stand by my assertion. Anyway I don’t think that we really disagree about the facts. I just guess that you seem to infer that I derive relevantly different ethics from it.
But that’s not what you said. You said that humans “have no general aversion to eating other humans”.
Humans, for example, do have an aversion to death, pain, and hunger—and yet suicides, self-flagellation, and fasts are are recurring motif in human history.
Maybe it’s a language issue. “Have an aversion to X” does not mean “will never ever do X”. It means “would prefer not to do X, but will do it if necessary”.
Which one exactly?
This: ”… that humans do have a general aversion to killing other humans and that they manage to overcome that aversion rather easily.”
Looks a bit so.I meant it a bit more like repugnance or atrocity. Rereading the dialog it is also not clear whether the stress is on “general” or “aversion”.
Nonetheless I’d think that your “would prefer not to do X, but will do it if necessary” is still too strong given the example of the Yanomamö. At least it is not strong enough to allow cooperation of any the villages within ‘recorded history’. How about “would prefer not to do X to an enemy, if the risk is too high” or “would prefer not to do X to an outsider if indifferent”. Though even that may be too weak. I think there is not really an aversion itstead killing is countered primarily by empathy (which is a strong emotion easily activated by living beings) and risk (physical and social).
Hmm, I can’t see any obvious utilitarian approach under which a cannibal society would be justified.
First, it would have to be a non-human society, or a society where humans had been substantially modified to remove their revulsion at eating other humans.
Second, under total utilitarian logic, it looks like there could be more people sustained on a bare subsistence diet (all of them with lives barely worth living) than could be sustained by breeding one bunch of humans to be consumed by other humans. So total utilitarians should reject the cannibal society: ironically, it may not be repugnant enough for the Repugnant Conclusion to hold! Under the same “repugnant” logic, total utilitarians would abolish meat eating and eradicate wild animals, whenever that led to an increase in the human population.
Average utilitarians would also reject the cannibal society, since they could improve the welfare of an average human by just not breeding the cannibal victims. It’s less clear to me what average utilitarians should do about farm animals and wildlife. This depends on whether these animals are included in the average at equal weight with humans, or whether there are different weighting factors. If equal weighting, then eradicating all non-human animal life would increase the average welfare of what’s left. This is another sort of repugnant conclusion of course.
However, none of these is the strongest reason for rejecting a cannibal scenario. The strongest reason appears to be the Kantian one: it’s wrong to treat human beings as means to an end. Whereas there seems to be no similar Kantian injunction against treating animals as means to an end.
It’s interesting that there is this asymmetry, which does initially look like outright speciesism. However, the crucial asymmetry is probably between agents who can be expected to be bound by a shared set of moral rules (including the rule of not using each other) and other beings who are not and cannot be bound by the same rules. If there were non-human animals, with whom we could agree to share a moral code, then the code could say it is wrong to use them as means to an end as well.
Humans have no general aversion to eating other humans. Same as they have no general aversion to killing other humans. Their were enough societies that routinely ate killed enemies. Humans do have aversion to killing and eating anyone/anything the feel empathy for. But whom you feel empathy for is strongly socialized. Sure empathy with children is strong but children of enemies were also often killed.
Don’t commit the ‘typical society fallacy’ of projecting and generalizing your (societies) values. Our society exists because it is more stable and competitive than tribal societies which played a less efficient competitive game. This means that a having humane values is a winning strategy for a society. But it is not ‘right’. It is just ethical.
Otherwise I basically agree with the utilitarian reasoning. Note that utilitarianism isn’t neccessarily the only possible approach.
That is not true because cannibalism is rare. Moreover, many cases of cannibalism are ritual and symbolic.
That is not true either. Being psychopathic is not a human norm. Clearly, humans can and do kill other humans when they feel the need for it, but “aversion” is a very weak work. I have no problem saying that humans do have a general aversion to killing other humans and that they manage to overcome that aversion rather easily.
Agreed. Rare it is. But then you agree that it does occur voluntary in normal healthy adult humans.
That only qualifies it but doesn’t exclude it. In the opposite it means that it can be sufficiently ‘normal’ to have become part of tradition and customs.
That has nothing to do with psychosis. It just means that killing other people can be quite nomal for human tribes. I recommend having a look at the Yanomamö:
http://www.artofmanliness.com/2013/06/10/the-yanomamo-and-the-origins-of-male-honor/
ADDED QUOTES:
The range of behavior that historically has occurred “voluntary in normal healthy adult humans” is very very wide.
Not psychosis but psychopathy.
Yes, sometimes. However I stand by my assertion in the parent post.
Indeed. That is exactly the point.
That’s what I meant. My fingers just typed something differnt.
Which one exactly?
The point is that killing/eating other humans/animals is nothing special. It is part of human behavior in so far as it is no outlier or random/accidental (mis)behavior but in the normal action continuum well integrated with suitable affects moderating it. That is the reason why it can be socially moderated/ritualized/tabooed.
And this doesn’t say anything about large-society-ethics. But large-society-ethics has to consider this part of human wiring/complex utility function.
I also stand by my assertion. Anyway I don’t think that we really disagree about the facts. I just guess that you seem to infer that I derive relevantly different ethics from it.
But that’s not what you said. You said that humans “have no general aversion to eating other humans”.
Humans, for example, do have an aversion to death, pain, and hunger—and yet suicides, self-flagellation, and fasts are are recurring motif in human history.
Maybe it’s a language issue. “Have an aversion to X” does not mean “will never ever do X”. It means “would prefer not to do X, but will do it if necessary”.
This: ”… that humans do have a general aversion to killing other humans and that they manage to overcome that aversion rather easily.”
Looks a bit so.I meant it a bit more like repugnance or atrocity. Rereading the dialog it is also not clear whether the stress is on “general” or “aversion”. Nonetheless I’d think that your “would prefer not to do X, but will do it if necessary” is still too strong given the example of the Yanomamö. At least it is not strong enough to allow cooperation of any the villages within ‘recorded history’. How about “would prefer not to do X to an enemy, if the risk is too high” or “would prefer not to do X to an outsider if indifferent”. Though even that may be too weak. I think there is not really an aversion itstead killing is countered primarily by empathy (which is a strong emotion easily activated by living beings) and risk (physical and social).