That’s more or less what I intended them to be. Isn’t doing only the most effective activities available to you… a good idea?
I felt like it was a bit unfair for you to use fully general counterarguments against veganism in particular. However, after your most recent reply, I can better see where you’re coming from. I think a better message to take from this essay (although I’m not sure Peter would agree) is that people in general should eat less meat, not necessarily you in particular. If you can get one other person to become a vegan in lieu of becoming one yourself, that’s just as good.
I think the disagreement is about the ethical character of vegetarianism, not about whether it’s a psychologically or aesthetically appealing life-decision (to some people).
If non-vegans are less effective at reducing suffering than vegans due to a quirk of human psychology (i.e. cognitive dissonance preventing them from caring sufficiently about non-humans), then this becomes an ethical issue and not just a psychological one.
To assess (4) I think we’d need to look at the broader ethical and neurological theories that entail it, and assess the evidence for and against them. This is a big project.
I agree with you here. I feel sufficiently confident that animal suffering matters, but the empirical evidence here is rather weak.
I felt like it was a bit unfair for you to use fully general counterarguments against veganism in particular. However, after your most recent reply, I can better see where you’re coming from. I think a better message to take from this essay (although I’m not sure Peter would agree) is that people in general should eat less meat, not necessarily you in particular. If you can get one other person to become a vegan in lieu of becoming one yourself, that’s just as good.
If non-vegans are less effective at reducing suffering than vegans due to a quirk of human psychology (i.e. cognitive dissonance preventing them from caring sufficiently about non-humans), then this becomes an ethical issue and not just a psychological one.
I agree with you here. I feel sufficiently confident that animal suffering matters, but the empirical evidence here is rather weak.