OK. So, having clarified that, I return to your initial comment:
The distinction you are making between the input-output function of a human as a “choice” vs. the input-output of a machine as “not-a-choice” sounds very reminiscent of the traditional naive / confused model of free will that people commonly have before dissolving the question
...and am as puzzled by it as I was in the first place.
You agree that the input-output function of a human differs from the input-output of a machine like a light switch in ways that make it more useful to model the former but not the latter as maximizing preferences. (To adopt the intentional stance towards the former and the design stance towards the latter, in Dennett’s terminology.)
So, given that, what is your objection to Lumifer’s distinction? “Choice” seems like a perfectly reasonable word to use when taking an intentional stance, and to not use when taking a design stance.
When I asked earlier, you explained that your objection had to do with attributing “territory-level” differences to humans and machines, when it’s really a “map-level” objection… that it’s possible to talk about a light-switch’s choices, or not talk about a human’s choices, so it’s not really a difference in the system at all, just a difference in the speaker.
But given that you agree that there’s a salient “territory-level” difference between the two systems (specifically, the differences which make the intentional stance more useful than the design stance wrt humans, but not wrt light-switches), I don’t quite get the objection. Sure, it’s possible to take either stance towards either system, but it’s more useful to take the intentional stance towards humans, and that’s a “fact about the territory.”
Because in the preceding comment, I was demonstrating that we should not morally care about light switches, search engines, and paperclippers...whereas we should morally care about fishes, dogs, and humans… because of differences in the preference profiles of these beings when they are modeled as agents.
Peter Hurford disagreed with me on the non-moral status of the paper-clipper. I was demonstrating the non-moral status of a being which cared only for paper clips by analogy to a search engine (a being which only cares about bringing up the best search result).
Whereas what Lumifer was saying is that the very premise that a search engine could have choices was fundamentally flawed (which, if true, would cause the whole analogy to break down).
The thing is, it’s not fundamentally flawed to thing of a search engine as having choices. Sure, search engines are a little less usefully modeled as agent-like when compared to humans, but it’s just a matter of degree.
the input-output function of a human as a “choice” vs. the input-output of a machine as “not-a-choice”
I was objecting to his hard, qualitative binary, not your and Dennet’s soft/qualitative spectrum.
OK. So, having clarified that, I return to your initial comment:
...and am as puzzled by it as I was in the first place.
You agree that the input-output function of a human differs from the input-output of a machine like a light switch in ways that make it more useful to model the former but not the latter as maximizing preferences. (To adopt the intentional stance towards the former and the design stance towards the latter, in Dennett’s terminology.)
So, given that, what is your objection to Lumifer’s distinction? “Choice” seems like a perfectly reasonable word to use when taking an intentional stance, and to not use when taking a design stance.
When I asked earlier, you explained that your objection had to do with attributing “territory-level” differences to humans and machines, when it’s really a “map-level” objection… that it’s possible to talk about a light-switch’s choices, or not talk about a human’s choices, so it’s not really a difference in the system at all, just a difference in the speaker.
But given that you agree that there’s a salient “territory-level” difference between the two systems (specifically, the differences which make the intentional stance more useful than the design stance wrt humans, but not wrt light-switches), I don’t quite get the objection. Sure, it’s possible to take either stance towards either system, but it’s more useful to take the intentional stance towards humans, and that’s a “fact about the territory.”
No?
Because in the preceding comment, I was demonstrating that we should not morally care about light switches, search engines, and paperclippers...whereas we should morally care about fishes, dogs, and humans… because of differences in the preference profiles of these beings when they are modeled as agents.
Peter Hurford disagreed with me on the non-moral status of the paper-clipper. I was demonstrating the non-moral status of a being which cared only for paper clips by analogy to a search engine (a being which only cares about bringing up the best search result).
Whereas what Lumifer was saying is that the very premise that a search engine could have choices was fundamentally flawed (which, if true, would cause the whole analogy to break down).
The thing is, it’s not fundamentally flawed to thing of a search engine as having choices. Sure, search engines are a little less usefully modeled as agent-like when compared to humans, but it’s just a matter of degree.
I was objecting to his hard, qualitative binary, not your and Dennet’s soft/qualitative spectrum.
Thanks for clarifying.