I’m a bit sceptical about this claim. I don’t think he has actually been presenting much evidence in favor of the adaptation hypothesis. Yes, he’s done a great job of presenting a variety of behavior and demonstrated that there are more plausible explanations for those behaviors than the commonly acknowledged ones. So he has demonstrated that humans are hypocrites. This is different from presenting evidence in favor of hypocrisy being an evolved adaptation.
I haven’t seen a lot of this, either. This account is moderately persuasive, however.
The more detailed and sophisticated seem our capacities for subtle self-benefiting hypocrisy, the less plausible becomes the view that hypocrisy is mostly accidental, or the result of a few small hypocrisy modules.
Compare:
“The more detailed and sophisticated seem our capacities for using computers in various and subtle ways, the less plausible becomes the view that our computer-using skills are mostly accidental, or the result of a few small computer use modules.”
Not sure I understand your point here. I think the difference is that Hanson doesn’t consider human hypocrisy to be a conscious act in the way that computer use is. Do you dispute that?
What you said before
Of course, “which of these hypotheses is the correct one” may be a somewhat confused question. It could very well be that near/far started out as separate systems simply because coherence is hard, and then hypocrisy being useful worked to counteract selective pressure that would’ve integrated them in a more complete manner. There may also have been other functions.
is probably right.
I’m not sure how to evaluate the complexity penalties associated with these hypotheses.
I haven’t seen a lot of this, either. This account is moderately persuasive, however.
Thanks—I had either missed that or forgotten it. You’re right, it does seem somewhat persuasive, though still rather speculative.
Not sure I understand your point here. I think the difference is that Hanson doesn’t consider human hypocrisy to be a conscious act in the way that computer use is. Do you dispute that?
I don’t dispute that.
My point is that we have a variety of complex, subtle behaviors driven by modules that were originally evolved for completely different purposes. Nobody would claim that because we can use computers well, we must have evolved to use them. It’s a given that we’ve simply co-opted existing modules for entirely new purposes. But “our computer-use skills prove that we evolved to use computers” is of the same logical form as “our hypocrisy skills prove that we evolved to be hypocrites”—if one is fallacious, then the other must be as well. (Though it could probably be made non-fallacious with more supporting arguments.)
Overall, though, I feel like speculating over the evolutionary origin of a specific behavior is something of a red herring, for reasons I’ve covered before. We can never really know for sure what the real evolutionary reason for something was. Even if we could, knowing it constrains our anticipations much less than actually studying how the thing behaves in a modern-day environment.
I haven’t seen a lot of this, either. This account is moderately persuasive, however.
Not sure I understand your point here. I think the difference is that Hanson doesn’t consider human hypocrisy to be a conscious act in the way that computer use is. Do you dispute that?
What you said before
is probably right.
I’m not sure how to evaluate the complexity penalties associated with these hypotheses.
Thanks—I had either missed that or forgotten it. You’re right, it does seem somewhat persuasive, though still rather speculative.
I don’t dispute that.
My point is that we have a variety of complex, subtle behaviors driven by modules that were originally evolved for completely different purposes. Nobody would claim that because we can use computers well, we must have evolved to use them. It’s a given that we’ve simply co-opted existing modules for entirely new purposes. But “our computer-use skills prove that we evolved to use computers” is of the same logical form as “our hypocrisy skills prove that we evolved to be hypocrites”—if one is fallacious, then the other must be as well. (Though it could probably be made non-fallacious with more supporting arguments.)
Overall, though, I feel like speculating over the evolutionary origin of a specific behavior is something of a red herring, for reasons I’ve covered before. We can never really know for sure what the real evolutionary reason for something was. Even if we could, knowing it constrains our anticipations much less than actually studying how the thing behaves in a modern-day environment.