Haidt’s claim is that liberals rely on purity/sacredness relatively less often, but it’s still there. Some of the earlier work on the purity axis put heavy emphasis on sex or sin. Since then, Haidt has acknowledged that the difference between liberals and conservatives might even out if you add food or environmental concerns to purity.
Yeah, environmentalist attitudes towards e.g. GMOs and nuclear power look awfully purity-minded to me. I’m not sure whether I want to count environmentalism/Green thought as part of the mainline Left, though; it’s certainly not central to it, and seems to be its own thing in a lot of ways.
(Cladistically speaking it’s definitely not. But cladistics can get you in trouble when you’re looking at political movements.)
Maybe it’s about rationalization. The same feeling could be expressed by one person as: “this is a heresy” (because “heresy” is their party’s official boo light) and by another person as: “this could harm people” (because “harming people” is their party’s official boo light). But in fact both people just feel the idea is repulsive to them, but can’t quickly explain why.
I think this could be generalized into a model with predictions: If we suppose that it’s easier to get people to nominally than actually abandon one of Haidt’s moral axes (from Wikipedia, to save people some lookups: Care/harm, Fairness/cheating, Liberty/oppression, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/degradation), we should expect that people who disclaim one of the axes will find ways to relabel violations of that axis to make it sound like it’s violating a professed axis.
To be specific, if you have a group that officially disclaims the fairness/cheating axis, I expect they’ll be quick to explain how cheating is a form of harm. Or drop the care/harm axis, and we’ll probably hear about how harm is a form of oppression. And so forth.
Yes, but I don’t believe it. As a test, imagine someone offers to give $1 billion to a city if it makes one public water fountain white’s only. I bet most liberals would be horrified at the idea of the city accepting the offer.
I imagine that most people in the US would find such a transaction rather unnerving, regardless of political leanings, so this is not a good test of liberal views. Do you have a better example of a correlation between valuing political correctness and liberal views?
I don’t think it matters of it’s racial. The general principle of having someone try to buy out a government’s espoused moral principles sounds Very Bad. The reasoning is that if the government can be bought once, it can be bought twice, and thus it can be bought in general and is in the control of moneyed donors rather than the voting populace, proof by induction on the naturals—so to speak.
Lobbyists and their money already have massive influence over governments. Plus, whether it’s a good or bad idea, my claim is that most liberals would find the idea disgusting.
Haidt acknowledges that liberals feel disgust at racism and that this falls under purity/sacredness (explicitly listing it in a somewhat older article on Table 1, pg 59). His claim is that liberals rely on the purity/sacredness scale relatively more often, not that they never engage it. Still, in your example, I’d expect the typical reaction to be anger at a fairness violation rather than disgust.
You’re familiar with the idea of anthropomorphization, right? Well, by analogy to that, I would call what you did here “rationalistomorphization,” a word I wish was added to LessWrong jargon.
This reaction needs only scope insensitivity to explain, you don’t need to invoke purity. Though I actually agree with you that liberals have a disgust moral center.
If you are told a billion dollars hasn’t been taxed from people in a city, how many people getting to keep a thousand dollars (say) do you imagine? Probably not a million of them. How many hours not worked, or small things that they buy do you imagine? Probably not any.
But now that I think about it, I’d rather have an extra thousand dollars than be able to drink at a particular drinking fountain.
But I don’t think fairness the morality center is necessarily fairness over differing amounts of harm. It could be differing over social status. You could have an inflated sense of fairness, so that you cared much more than the underlying difference in what people get.
Economics being what it is, this is evidence that your hypothetical segregationist throwback is expecting to get more than a billion dollars of value out of the deal. That doesn’t quite establish that someone’s trying to screw the city, but it does gesture pretty emphatically in that direction; actual political sentiments hardly enter into it, except insofar as they provide exploitable tensions.
(If I were the mayor, I’d take the money and then build the fountain as part of a practical exhibit in a civil rights museum.)
I thought the research was that liberals didn’t have purity axis of morality (Haidt, is it?).
Haidt’s claim is that liberals rely on purity/sacredness relatively less often, but it’s still there. Some of the earlier work on the purity axis put heavy emphasis on sex or sin. Since then, Haidt has acknowledged that the difference between liberals and conservatives might even out if you add food or environmental concerns to purity.
Yeah, environmentalist attitudes towards e.g. GMOs and nuclear power look awfully purity-minded to me. I’m not sure whether I want to count environmentalism/Green thought as part of the mainline Left, though; it’s certainly not central to it, and seems to be its own thing in a lot of ways.
(Cladistically speaking it’s definitely not. But cladistics can get you in trouble when you’re looking at political movements.)
Maybe it’s about rationalization. The same feeling could be expressed by one person as: “this is a heresy” (because “heresy” is their party’s official boo light) and by another person as: “this could harm people” (because “harming people” is their party’s official boo light). But in fact both people just feel the idea is repulsive to them, but can’t quickly explain why.
I think this could be generalized into a model with predictions: If we suppose that it’s easier to get people to nominally than actually abandon one of Haidt’s moral axes (from Wikipedia, to save people some lookups: Care/harm, Fairness/cheating, Liberty/oppression, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/degradation), we should expect that people who disclaim one of the axes will find ways to relabel violations of that axis to make it sound like it’s violating a professed axis.
To be specific, if you have a group that officially disclaims the fairness/cheating axis, I expect they’ll be quick to explain how cheating is a form of harm. Or drop the care/harm axis, and we’ll probably hear about how harm is a form of oppression. And so forth.
Related: Fake Morality
Yes, but I don’t believe it. As a test, imagine someone offers to give $1 billion to a city if it makes one public water fountain white’s only. I bet most liberals would be horrified at the idea of the city accepting the offer.
I imagine that most people in the US would find such a transaction rather unnerving, regardless of political leanings, so this is not a good test of liberal views. Do you have a better example of a correlation between valuing political correctness and liberal views?
Hate speech. The liberal response to what Larry Summers said about women and math seems motivated by disgust.
I don’t think it matters of it’s racial. The general principle of having someone try to buy out a government’s espoused moral principles sounds Very Bad. The reasoning is that if the government can be bought once, it can be bought twice, and thus it can be bought in general and is in the control of moneyed donors rather than the voting populace, proof by induction on the naturals—so to speak.
Lobbyists and their money already have massive influence over governments. Plus, whether it’s a good or bad idea, my claim is that most liberals would find the idea disgusting.
Haidt acknowledges that liberals feel disgust at racism and that this falls under purity/sacredness (explicitly listing it in a somewhat older article on Table 1, pg 59). His claim is that liberals rely on the purity/sacredness scale relatively more often, not that they never engage it. Still, in your example, I’d expect the typical reaction to be anger at a fairness violation rather than disgust.
But since the harm is trivial, no one is being treated unfairly absent disgust considerations.
You’re familiar with the idea of anthropomorphization, right? Well, by analogy to that, I would call what you did here “rationalistomorphization,” a word I wish was added to LessWrong jargon.
This reaction needs only scope insensitivity to explain, you don’t need to invoke purity. Though I actually agree with you that liberals have a disgust moral center.
How so?
If you are told a billion dollars hasn’t been taxed from people in a city, how many people getting to keep a thousand dollars (say) do you imagine? Probably not a million of them. How many hours not worked, or small things that they buy do you imagine? Probably not any.
But now that I think about it, I’d rather have an extra thousand dollars than be able to drink at a particular drinking fountain.
But I don’t think fairness the morality center is necessarily fairness over differing amounts of harm. It could be differing over social status. You could have an inflated sense of fairness, so that you cared much more than the underlying difference in what people get.
Economics being what it is, this is evidence that your hypothetical segregationist throwback is expecting to get more than a billion dollars of value out of the deal. That doesn’t quite establish that someone’s trying to screw the city, but it does gesture pretty emphatically in that direction; actual political sentiments hardly enter into it, except insofar as they provide exploitable tensions.
(If I were the mayor, I’d take the money and then build the fountain as part of a practical exhibit in a civil rights museum.)