Say that agent A is zonkerly predictive and agent B is pleglishly predictive. A’s knowledge about B’s predictive accuracy allows A to make an inference that leads from that knowledge to a deduction that B will cooperate if A defects. B can predict every action that A will take. It’s the difference between you reasoning abstractly about how else a program must work given your current understanding of how it works, and running the program.
Not sure I understand your question… It’s provable that the agents behave differently, so there you have a mathy explanation. As for non-mathy explanations, I think the best one is Gary’s original description of the ASP problem.
In your setup it does. It is making accurate predictions, doesn’t it? Always?
Say that agent A is zonkerly predictive and agent B is pleglishly predictive. A’s knowledge about B’s predictive accuracy allows A to make an inference that leads from that knowledge to a deduction that B will cooperate if A defects. B can predict every action that A will take. It’s the difference between you reasoning abstractly about how else a program must work given your current understanding of how it works, and running the program.
As long as you are always making accurate predictions, does the distinction matter?
Yes, you can make the distinction mathematically precise, as I did in this post (which is the “Slepnev 2011” reference in the OP).
Yes, I understand that, but my question is why does the distinction matter in this context?
Not sure I understand your question… It’s provable that the agents behave differently, so there you have a mathy explanation. As for non-mathy explanations, I think the best one is Gary’s original description of the ASP problem.
Do you understand the statement and proof in the 2nd half of the post?