That book is from 2006. I understand that it deals with the Paradox of Voting, but does it have anything that would be directly relevant to considering it in light of “acausal decision theories”? As far as I know, such theories pretty much didn’t exist back then.
Drescher coined the term “acausal” in the context of decision theory, in Good and Real. His arguments and ideas are remarkably similar to things Yudkowsky and others on LessWrong have said in the decade or so since. One of my side projects (which I keep putting off) is to explore his proposed decision theory (which differs from CDT and EDT and, notably, one-boxes even in Transparent Newcomb!) in more detail, to see how it compares to stuff LessWrong talks about.
That book is from 2006. I understand that it deals with the Paradox of Voting, but does it have anything that would be directly relevant to considering it in light of “acausal decision theories”? As far as I know, such theories pretty much didn’t exist back then.
Drescher coined the term “acausal” in the context of decision theory, in Good and Real. His arguments and ideas are remarkably similar to things Yudkowsky and others on LessWrong have said in the decade or so since. One of my side projects (which I keep putting off) is to explore his proposed decision theory (which differs from CDT and EDT and, notably, one-boxes even in Transparent Newcomb!) in more detail, to see how it compares to stuff LessWrong talks about.