Because I think ‘the bit’ is different. Time moves in a linear fashion, and effects propagate outward from their point of origin, flipping all sorts of coins all over the place that would have otherwise landed on the other side.
Of course “the bit” is, in actuality, different.
If “the bit” wasn’t different, d(utility)/d(work-on-utilitiometer) would be zero. But unless you know the difference, the effective difference to you is zero.
If I present you with two locked boxes, one with a diamond in, the other without, picking one will get you the diamond, the other won’t.
But unless you have some way of telling which box contains the diamond, you might as well pick the one that looks nicer.
Likewise with the coins; which way up you put it will affect the series of tosses unpredictably. But on average, it evens out. That″s the needed realisation.
unless you know the difference, the effective difference to you is zero.
I think that’s leaving the future out of the calculation since it’s otherwise hard to predict, and gets back to the original point that increases in predictive power seem to be more powerful than any other kind of utility, to the point where a loop forms.
As long as you recognise that there must be a point at which that is no longer true (ie. when your expected remaining rational lifespan is <1 year, will that still be true?) then it’s not necessarily a problem.
Honing your skills before beginning work is often good. Honing your skills until the day you die is always bad.
But you need to actually pay attention to how effective increases in your prediction are. If 2 years worth of work makes you 5% better at generting utility, then you need to stop work once you’ve got 40 or less years left.
Of course “the bit” is, in actuality, different. If “the bit” wasn’t different, d(utility)/d(work-on-utilitiometer) would be zero. But unless you know the difference, the effective difference to you is zero.
If I present you with two locked boxes, one with a diamond in, the other without, picking one will get you the diamond, the other won’t.
But unless you have some way of telling which box contains the diamond, you might as well pick the one that looks nicer.
Likewise with the coins; which way up you put it will affect the series of tosses unpredictably. But on average, it evens out. That″s the needed realisation.
I think that’s leaving the future out of the calculation since it’s otherwise hard to predict, and gets back to the original point that increases in predictive power seem to be more powerful than any other kind of utility, to the point where a loop forms.
As long as you recognise that there must be a point at which that is no longer true (ie. when your expected remaining rational lifespan is <1 year, will that still be true?) then it’s not necessarily a problem.
Honing your skills before beginning work is often good. Honing your skills until the day you die is always bad.
But you need to actually pay attention to how effective increases in your prediction are. If 2 years worth of work makes you 5% better at generting utility, then you need to stop work once you’ve got 40 or less years left.
Not if “do nothing, then die” is the optimal path… otherwise agreed.