As I added in my edit, I find it plausible (though not certainly the case) that the ethical systems of individuals have often amounted to merely obeying social rules. Indeed, for the most part they continue to do so. I don’t think we disagree.
That said, as far as the scholarly examination of morality goes there wasn’t any kind of paradigm shift away from duty-based theories to “happiness” based theories. Either theories that dealt with duty and following rules means something like Kantian ethics or Divine Rule in which case the Enlightenment saw an increase in such theories OR duty-based theory just refers to any theory which generates rules and duties in which case utilitarianism is just as much a duty-based theory as anything else (as it entails a duty to maximize utility).
Virtue ethics “was generally about following rules” only in this second sense. Obviously virtue ethics dealt with happiness in a different way then utilitarianism, since, you know, they’re not the same thing. I agree that the word that Ancient Greek word that gets translated as happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics means something different from what we mean by happiness. I like “flourishing”. But it certainly includes happiness and is far more central (for Aristotle Eudamonia is the purpose of your existence) to virtue ethics than duty is.
Bentham and Mill were definitely innovators, I’m not disputing that. But I think their innovation had more to do with their consequentialism than their hedonism. What seems crucially new, to me, is that actions are evaluated exclusively by the effect they have on the world. Previous ethical theories are theories for the powerless. When you don’t know how you the effect the world it doesn’t make any sense to judge actions by the effect. The scientific revolution, and in particular the resulting British empiricism were crucial for making this sort of innovation possible.
Its also true that certain kinds of pleasure came to be looked down upon less than they were looked down upon before but I think this has less to do with the theoretical. innovations of utilitarianism then with economic and social changes leading to changes in what counts as virtue which Hume noted. After all, Mill felt the need to distinguish between higher (art, friendship, etc.) and lower pleasures (sex, food, drink) the former of which couldn’t be traded for any amount of the lower and were vast more valuable.
Anyway, I definitely agree that you don’t have to be a utilitarian to make moral judgments. I was just replying to the notion that pre-utilitarian theories were best understood as being A) About duty and B) Not about happiness.
As I added in my edit, I find it plausible (though not certainly the case) that the ethical systems of individuals have often amounted to merely obeying social rules. Indeed, for the most part they continue to do so. I don’t think we disagree.
That said, as far as the scholarly examination of morality goes there wasn’t any kind of paradigm shift away from duty-based theories to “happiness” based theories. Either theories that dealt with duty and following rules means something like Kantian ethics or Divine Rule in which case the Enlightenment saw an increase in such theories OR duty-based theory just refers to any theory which generates rules and duties in which case utilitarianism is just as much a duty-based theory as anything else (as it entails a duty to maximize utility).
Virtue ethics “was generally about following rules” only in this second sense. Obviously virtue ethics dealt with happiness in a different way then utilitarianism, since, you know, they’re not the same thing. I agree that the word that Ancient Greek word that gets translated as happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics means something different from what we mean by happiness. I like “flourishing”. But it certainly includes happiness and is far more central (for Aristotle Eudamonia is the purpose of your existence) to virtue ethics than duty is.
Bentham and Mill were definitely innovators, I’m not disputing that. But I think their innovation had more to do with their consequentialism than their hedonism. What seems crucially new, to me, is that actions are evaluated exclusively by the effect they have on the world. Previous ethical theories are theories for the powerless. When you don’t know how you the effect the world it doesn’t make any sense to judge actions by the effect. The scientific revolution, and in particular the resulting British empiricism were crucial for making this sort of innovation possible.
Its also true that certain kinds of pleasure came to be looked down upon less than they were looked down upon before but I think this has less to do with the theoretical. innovations of utilitarianism then with economic and social changes leading to changes in what counts as virtue which Hume noted. After all, Mill felt the need to distinguish between higher (art, friendship, etc.) and lower pleasures (sex, food, drink) the former of which couldn’t be traded for any amount of the lower and were vast more valuable.
Anyway, I definitely agree that you don’t have to be a utilitarian to make moral judgments. I was just replying to the notion that pre-utilitarian theories were best understood as being A) About duty and B) Not about happiness.