One major point I think is under-discussed is what this means for nuclear proliferation.
Ukraine used to possess nuclear weapons, but agreed to give them up in exchange for promises of protection from the US and Russia.
With this plus the fall of Gaddafi in Libya a while back, it’s hard to see a result that isn’t ‘everyone wants to get nuclear weapons ASAP, and no-one wants to give them up.’ If promises of protection in exchange for nonproliferation aren’t upheld, there’s very little incentive for nonproliferation.
Apparently, in one important sense this isn’t true: they physically possessed the weapons, but not the capacity to do anything with them. [I have no personal knowledge on this—just something I bumped into today, but it seems credible] [EDIT: the point about non-upholding of protection agreements stands; I just wanted to clarify what “possess nuclear weapons” meant in this context]
Apparently, in one important sense this isn’t true: they physically possessed the weapons, but not the capacity to do anything with them.
That’s an important point.
However, I believe that a highly industrialized nation with modern nuclear weapons (but without the launch codes) would have had the capacity to do something with them. Using the weapons grade material (not only the fissible material, also the electronics etc) and using the weapons as prototypes for designing warheads should have had the potential to greatly accelerate a nuclear weapons program.
So, in a way this case is quite similar to Gaddafi’s—not giving up a functional nuclear arsenal (only South Africa has done that up to now, and I don’t think there will be a second case any time soon) but giving up the potential for a nuclear weapons program.
The most interesting thing out of this is Russia’s threat to pull out of New START in retaliation for US sanctions, as well as Biden’s decision to cut off arms control talks. Pulling out all the stops on the US-Russia nuclear competition is dangerous enough already, but this will most likely kick off a renewed all-out three-way nuclear arms race, which is of course less strategically stable than the bilateral nuclear dynamic during the Cold War. China is already expanding its nuclear arsenal to parity, which if New START were still in effect, would’ve been 1500 deployed warheads (incidentally today the first silo field seems to have finished construction ahead of schedule). The US had hoped to rope China into its bilateral arms control agreements with Russia; well, now there’d be nothing left to rope into.
One major point I think is under-discussed is what this means for nuclear proliferation.
Interesting analysis from a Twitter thread. You may want to view the original, as I am only quoting the text and many of the Tweets use an external link for more context:
Haven’t tweet much on Ukraine crisis for multiple reasons. But developments in the last 24 hours are heartbreaking and a preview of great brutality I fear is coming. A few observations here on the nuclear & conventional dimensions.
Putin’s pointed, not-veiled nuclear threats are really remarkable, signaling a willingness to turn to the country’s arsenal if the West interferes with the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
This is about the clearest evidence I have ever seen for the Stability-Instability Paradox: the notion that mutual vulnerability (“MAD”) at the strategic nuclear level can actually make conflict more likely at lower rungs of the escalation ladder.
Deterrence theorists associated with the Nuclear Revolution often dismiss this idea, arguing that nuclear stalemate means both sides will avoid crises and conflicts out of the fear they could escalate. The result should be peace, stability, and less military competition.
Yet Putin’s behavior suggests that revisionist actors are not so inhibited and may instead use their strategic nuclear forces as a shield behind which they can pursue conventional aggression, knowing their nuclear threats may deter outside intervention.
Now of course, Ukraine is not a member of NATO, nor a U.S. treaty ally. But then neither is Taiwan. So if you think nuclear stalemate is going to keep the peace in the Strait, you would need to do some hard thinking about why it hasn’t kept the peace in Eastern Europe.
China, in fact, is developing the same types of forces that Putin references in his remarks: not only a survivable second-strike capability, but also theater nuclear forces suited for limited strikes for coercive escalation. Not a coincidence.
More broadly, as a student of military operations and foreign policy, it’s hard for me to see the Russian end game here either operationally or strategically, for reasons @jeffaedmonds and @KofmanMichael and others have identified.
Yes, at a tactical level Russia can steamroll Ukrainian regular forces, though I expect Ukraine can make this more costly than Russia has anticipated. Urban warfare is unkind to invaders, even strong ones. 8/ https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/1595.pdf
But beyond that, what is military endgame? Regime change and then puppet government? Difficulties of indefinitely occupying a nation of 41 million should be apparent after Soviet experiences with Warsaw Pact & Afghanistan, among others @dmedelstein
Russian invasion likely to provoke higher European defense spending, tighter NATO, deployment of NATO forces east, hostility with West. Ukraine was not headed for NATO membership any time soon, so a destabilizing invasion wasn’t necessary to forestall that perceived danger. 10/
At the strategic level, Russian invasion gives off big Schlieffen Plan energy. It is like committing suicide for fear of death, bringing about the very problems it is supposed to solve, and generating new ones like risks of inadvertent escalation. 11⁄11
It may not cause too great an impact. Everyone might want to have it. But at what cost? All Big Fives are roughly in the same trench in controlling the spread of nuclear weaponry. There are really very few countries that are in a delicate enough position to be able to develop them without facing dire consequences. Even then, they are only fission weapons. Thermal nuclear weapons are still Big Five exclusive. (I think India claim to have it, but the test yield is not conclusive)
Thermal nuclear weapons are still Big Five exclusive. (I think India claim to have it, but the test yield is not conclusive)
North Korea’s test on 3 September 2017 could have been thermonuclear, too (BBC). Of course, even if true, that does not mean that they have successfully weaponized it yet. But North Korea being able to do that would lead me to updating the probability of other countries being able to develop thermonuclear weapons.
One major point I think is under-discussed is what this means for nuclear proliferation.
Ukraine used to possess nuclear weapons, but agreed to give them up in exchange for promises of protection from the US and Russia.
With this plus the fall of Gaddafi in Libya a while back, it’s hard to see a result that isn’t ‘everyone wants to get nuclear weapons ASAP, and no-one wants to give them up.’ If promises of protection in exchange for nonproliferation aren’t upheld, there’s very little incentive for nonproliferation.
Apparently, in one important sense this isn’t true: they physically possessed the weapons, but not the capacity to do anything with them.
[I have no personal knowledge on this—just something I bumped into today, but it seems credible]
[EDIT: the point about non-upholding of protection agreements stands; I just wanted to clarify what “possess nuclear weapons” meant in this context]
That’s an important point.
However, I believe that a highly industrialized nation with modern nuclear weapons (but without the launch codes) would have had the capacity to do something with them. Using the weapons grade material (not only the fissible material, also the electronics etc) and using the weapons as prototypes for designing warheads should have had the potential to greatly accelerate a nuclear weapons program.
So, in a way this case is quite similar to Gaddafi’s—not giving up a functional nuclear arsenal (only South Africa has done that up to now, and I don’t think there will be a second case any time soon) but giving up the potential for a nuclear weapons program.
The most interesting thing out of this is Russia’s threat to pull out of New START in retaliation for US sanctions, as well as Biden’s decision to cut off arms control talks. Pulling out all the stops on the US-Russia nuclear competition is dangerous enough already, but this will most likely kick off a renewed all-out three-way nuclear arms race, which is of course less strategically stable than the bilateral nuclear dynamic during the Cold War. China is already expanding its nuclear arsenal to parity, which if New START were still in effect, would’ve been 1500 deployed warheads (incidentally today the first silo field seems to have finished construction ahead of schedule). The US had hoped to rope China into its bilateral arms control agreements with Russia; well, now there’d be nothing left to rope into.
Interesting analysis from a Twitter thread. You may want to view the original, as I am only quoting the text and many of the Tweets use an external link for more context:
https://twitter.com/ProfTalmadge/status/1496837475901362180
It may not cause too great an impact. Everyone might want to have it. But at what cost? All Big Fives are roughly in the same trench in controlling the spread of nuclear weaponry. There are really very few countries that are in a delicate enough position to be able to develop them without facing dire consequences. Even then, they are only fission weapons. Thermal nuclear weapons are still Big Five exclusive. (I think India claim to have it, but the test yield is not conclusive)
Interestingly, only about a month before the current war, all Big Five made a joint statement on preventing nuclear war and avoiding arms races.
North Korea’s test on 3 September 2017 could have been thermonuclear, too (BBC). Of course, even if true, that does not mean that they have successfully weaponized it yet. But North Korea being able to do that would lead me to updating the probability of other countries being able to develop thermonuclear weapons.