I have to admit I’m not actually sure what lesson most people take from the problem of the criterion.
Do people think circularity is a mistake, and we should use a typed theory of truth (so we might have an algorithm that accepts inputs of statements about the world and evaluates empirical_truth but returns a type error when run on algorithms with the same input/output structure as itself?). Or do people think that circularity is untrustworthy but not a sign of failure, and shows that we necessarily have some non-truth-based process by which we arrive at true algorithms for evaluating statements about the world? Or do people think our algorithms for determining truth can in fact be arrived at for truth-related reasons, there’s merely some essential self-reference inherent in how we define “truth” and “truth-seeking?”
Will people fight contingency to their dying breath, or are they mostly okay with Neurath’s boat?
I hope they are okay with Neurath’s boat, because that seems to be the world we live in. That is, the problem of the criterion shows us there is no solid foundation because we are born into contingency.
There’s certainly folks who wanted a typed theory of truth (logical positivists) and there are folks who refashion truth in the image of referential integrity (coherentists), but even for them it either means giving up completeness to get a typed theory or giving up objectivity since truth must be coherent with our subjective experience. So circularity isn’t really a sign of failure, it’s just how it is, and truth isn’t really about truth, it’s about signaling (just kidding, it’s about what we care about).
I have to admit I’m not actually sure what lesson most people take from the problem of the criterion.
Do people think circularity is a mistake, and we should use a typed theory of truth (so we might have an algorithm that accepts inputs of statements about the world and evaluates empirical_truth but returns a type error when run on algorithms with the same input/output structure as itself?). Or do people think that circularity is untrustworthy but not a sign of failure, and shows that we necessarily have some non-truth-based process by which we arrive at true algorithms for evaluating statements about the world? Or do people think our algorithms for determining truth can in fact be arrived at for truth-related reasons, there’s merely some essential self-reference inherent in how we define “truth” and “truth-seeking?”
Will people fight contingency to their dying breath, or are they mostly okay with Neurath’s boat?
I hope they are okay with Neurath’s boat, because that seems to be the world we live in. That is, the problem of the criterion shows us there is no solid foundation because we are born into contingency.
There’s certainly folks who wanted a typed theory of truth (logical positivists) and there are folks who refashion truth in the image of referential integrity (coherentists), but even for them it either means giving up completeness to get a typed theory or giving up objectivity since truth must be coherent with our subjective experience. So circularity isn’t really a sign of failure, it’s just how it is, and truth isn’t really about truth, it’s about signaling (just kidding, it’s about what we care about).