I’m asserting that saying “We must do X, because it produces good effect Y”, when there is option Z, which delivers the same Y for half the cost, is a delusion.
I’m asserting that saying “We must do X, because it produces good effect Y”, when there is option Z, which delivers the same Y for half the cost, is a delusion.
This seems more like a common cognitive error than a delusion. How are you defining delusion? It seems like I am using a more narrow definition of delusion. I’m using something like “statement or class of statements about the physical world that are demonstrably extremely unlikely to be true.” What definition are you using?
I’m using something like “statement or class of statements about the physical world that are demonstrably extremely unlikely to be true.” What definition are you using?
Lucas’s statement fits this definition. This may me be clearer if you consider just “we must do X”, which is a claim about the physical world. The because part does not happen to change this.
If you don’t agree that the truncated claim fits the criteria I infer that the most likely difference in definitions between you and Lucas is in not so much around ‘delusion’ but rather about what ‘must’ means in relation to the physical world. This would make what you say true even if it isn’t grounded in my preferred ontology.
Ah, so the issue is that I see “must” as entangled with moral and ethical claims that aren’t necessarily connected to the physical world in any useful fashion.
Exactly! And to delve somewhat deeper into the levels of meaning there are many who would say that ‘must’ or weaker ‘should’ claims are about satisfying a given ‘rightness’ function. Of those people many of them will say that the ‘rightness’ function can’t reasonably be described as something that is part of the physical world. After accepting that position some will say that a ‘must’ claim is making an objective assertion about what best satisfies a known ‘rightness’ function. In perhaps simpler terms, I’ll look at the X/Y example we already have:
“We must do X, because it produces good effect Y”, when there is option Z, which delivers the same Y for half the cost
There are various things that can be accepted or rejected as ‘delusions’, that may be considered claims about the physical world. (In most cases the proposed delusion would be the negation, but the ‘can?’ is symmetric.)
Can lacking the belief “We must do things that have good effects” be a delusion?
Can lacking the belief “Y is a good effect” be a delusion?
Can lacking the belief “X has the effect Y” be a delusion?
Can lacking the belief “Z delivers the same Y for half the cost” be a delusion?
Can having the belief “We must do X even if Z does Y for half the cost” be a delusion?
Let’s see...
Your claim requires that your reject 1, 2 and 5 as possible candidates for delusion.
There are some that would reject 1 and 2 as candidates for delusion but say that 5 is a candidate because it implies fallacious reasoning based on the other arbitrary not-physical premises.
I accept 1 and 2 as possible candidates too via an ontology that formalises (and grounds in the physical) the way that normative claims are actually used in practice. But I never presume this definition when in conversation unless I know the others in the conversation are either familiar with technical formalism or using the colloquial meaning of ‘should/must’.
When I assert that Lucas’s statement is correct it is based off the “5” claim. It didn’t even occur to me to reject 5 as a possible delusion because it just seems so obvious to me. If you can’t make the claim without a mental screw up then it is a delusion, dammit! Even when is concluding something that you don’t consider to be part of the physical universe.
Exactly! And to delve somewhat deeper into the levels of meaning there are many who would say that ‘must’ or weaker ‘should’ claims are about satisfying a given ‘rightness’ function. Of those people many of them will say that the ‘rightness’ function can’t reasonably be described as something that is part of the physical world. After accepting that position some will say that a ‘must’ claim is making an objective assertion about what best satisfies a known ‘rightness’ function. In perhaps simpler terms, I’ll look at the X/Y example we already have:
“We must do X, because it produces good effect Y”, when there is option Z, which delivers the same Y for half the cost
There are various things that can be accepted or rejected as ‘delusions’, that may be considered claims about the physical world. (In most cases the proposed delusion would be the negation, but the ‘can?’ is symmetric.)
Can lacking the belief “We must do things that have good effects” be a delusion?
Can lacking the belief “Y is a good effect” be a delusion?
Can lacking the belief “X has the effect Y” be a delusion?
Can lacking the belief “Z delivers the same Y for half the cost” be a delusion?
Can having the belief “We must do X even if Z does Y for half the cost” be a delusion?
Let’s see...
Your claim requires that your reject 1, 2 and 5 as possible candidates for delusion.
There are some that would reject 1 and 2 as candidates for delusion but say that 5 is a candidate because it implies fallacious reasoning based on the other arbitrary not-physical premises.
I accept 1 and 2 as possible candidates too via an ontology that formalises (and grounds in the physical) the way that normative claims are actually used in practice. But I never presume this definition when in conversation unless I know the others in the conversation are either familiar with technical formalism or using the colloquial meaning of ‘should/must’.
When I assert that Lucas’s statement is correct it is based off the “5” claim. It didn’t even occur to me to reject 5 as a possible delusion because it just seems so obvious to me. If you can’t make the claim without a mental screw up then it is a delusion, dammit! Even when is concluding something that you don’t consider to be part of the physical universe.
This one.
Are you then asserting that non-utilitarian views constitute a delusion?
I’m asserting that saying “We must do X, because it produces good effect Y”, when there is option Z, which delivers the same Y for half the cost, is a delusion.
This seems more like a common cognitive error than a delusion. How are you defining delusion? It seems like I am using a more narrow definition of delusion. I’m using something like “statement or class of statements about the physical world that are demonstrably extremely unlikely to be true.” What definition are you using?
Lucas’s statement fits this definition. This may me be clearer if you consider just “we must do X”, which is a claim about the physical world. The because part does not happen to change this.
If you don’t agree that the truncated claim fits the criteria I infer that the most likely difference in definitions between you and Lucas is in not so much around ‘delusion’ but rather about what ‘must’ means in relation to the physical world. This would make what you say true even if it isn’t grounded in my preferred ontology.
Ah, so the issue is that I see “must” as entangled with moral and ethical claims that aren’t necessarily connected to the physical world in any useful fashion.
Exactly! And to delve somewhat deeper into the levels of meaning there are many who would say that ‘must’ or weaker ‘should’ claims are about satisfying a given ‘rightness’ function. Of those people many of them will say that the ‘rightness’ function can’t reasonably be described as something that is part of the physical world. After accepting that position some will say that a ‘must’ claim is making an objective assertion about what best satisfies a known ‘rightness’ function. In perhaps simpler terms, I’ll look at the X/Y example we already have:
There are various things that can be accepted or rejected as ‘delusions’, that may be considered claims about the physical world. (In most cases the proposed delusion would be the negation, but the ‘can?’ is symmetric.)
Can lacking the belief “We must do things that have good effects” be a delusion?
Can lacking the belief “Y is a good effect” be a delusion?
Can lacking the belief “X has the effect Y” be a delusion?
Can lacking the belief “Z delivers the same Y for half the cost” be a delusion?
Can having the belief “We must do X even if Z does Y for half the cost” be a delusion?
Let’s see...
Your claim requires that your reject 1, 2 and 5 as possible candidates for delusion.
There are some that would reject 1 and 2 as candidates for delusion but say that 5 is a candidate because it implies fallacious reasoning based on the other arbitrary not-physical premises.
I accept 1 and 2 as possible candidates too via an ontology that formalises (and grounds in the physical) the way that normative claims are actually used in practice. But I never presume this definition when in conversation unless I know the others in the conversation are either familiar with technical formalism or using the colloquial meaning of ‘should/must’.
When I assert that Lucas’s statement is correct it is based off the “5” claim. It didn’t even occur to me to reject 5 as a possible delusion because it just seems so obvious to me. If you can’t make the claim without a mental screw up then it is a delusion, dammit! Even when is concluding something that you don’t consider to be part of the physical universe.
Exactly! And to delve somewhat deeper into the levels of meaning there are many who would say that ‘must’ or weaker ‘should’ claims are about satisfying a given ‘rightness’ function. Of those people many of them will say that the ‘rightness’ function can’t reasonably be described as something that is part of the physical world. After accepting that position some will say that a ‘must’ claim is making an objective assertion about what best satisfies a known ‘rightness’ function. In perhaps simpler terms, I’ll look at the X/Y example we already have:
There are various things that can be accepted or rejected as ‘delusions’, that may be considered claims about the physical world. (In most cases the proposed delusion would be the negation, but the ‘can?’ is symmetric.)
Can lacking the belief “We must do things that have good effects” be a delusion?
Can lacking the belief “Y is a good effect” be a delusion?
Can lacking the belief “X has the effect Y” be a delusion?
Can lacking the belief “Z delivers the same Y for half the cost” be a delusion?
Can having the belief “We must do X even if Z does Y for half the cost” be a delusion?
Let’s see...
Your claim requires that your reject 1, 2 and 5 as possible candidates for delusion.
There are some that would reject 1 and 2 as candidates for delusion but say that 5 is a candidate because it implies fallacious reasoning based on the other arbitrary not-physical premises.
I accept 1 and 2 as possible candidates too via an ontology that formalises (and grounds in the physical) the way that normative claims are actually used in practice. But I never presume this definition when in conversation unless I know the others in the conversation are either familiar with technical formalism or using the colloquial meaning of ‘should/must’.
When I assert that Lucas’s statement is correct it is based off the “5” claim. It didn’t even occur to me to reject 5 as a possible delusion because it just seems so obvious to me. If you can’t make the claim without a mental screw up then it is a delusion, dammit! Even when is concluding something that you don’t consider to be part of the physical universe.