That’s at best an argument against the political viability of iterated straw drawing due to general irrationality, not against the rationality of iterated straw drawing itself. The pilots are definitely worse of when everyone is sent to their death. If the pilots opinions don’t matter sending them all to their death is the best option since it saves training costs. If a compromise acceptable to the pilots need to be found then iterated straw drawing is the best option for everyone for any possible mission count and any gived cadre size, provided the pilots can make the necessary precommitment. Command might possibly reject this compromise due to some pilots appearing to be freeloading, but would act irrationally in doing so.
Of course doing the straw drawing at an earlier stage and optimizing training for whether they are going to be sent to their death or not would be even more efficient, but that level of precommitment seems less psychologically plausible.
The problem is, pilots aren’t optimizing for overall survival. Somebody who wanted to live to see the end of the war, at all costs, could’ve just faked some medical problem and gotten themselves a desk job. The perceived-reproductive-fitness boost associated with being a member of the flight crew is contingent on actually flying (and making it back alive, of course). In simpler terms, nobody gets laid by drawing the long straw.
That’s your third completely unconnected argument, and this one doesn’t make Japan and return missions assuming viability of straw drawing rational either. Even if the pilots are rationally maximizing some combination of survival and military glory that doesn’t mean Japan bombing and return missions with most of the load devoted to fuel are an efficient way to gain it. You could have all pilots volunteering to be part of the draw for one way missions and those who draw long being reassigned to Europe or whereever they can earn glory more fuel efficiently.
You’re assuming that straw drawing is viable. I’m trying to show why it wasn’t.
You seem to have a theory, based on that invalid assumption, about what will and will not work to motivate people to take risks. Does that theory make any useful predictions in this case?
You’re assuming that straw drawing is viable. I’m trying to show why it wasn’t.
Then you are wasting everyones time, we already know that it wasn’t viable. It was suggested and rejected. The whole discussion was about a) what would be needed to make viable (e. g. sufficiently high rationality level and sufficiently strong precommitment) and b) whether it would be the rational thing to do given the requirements.
You seem to have a theory, based on that invalid assumption, about what will and will not work to motivate people to take risks. Does that theory make any useful predictions in this case?
No. I was taking your model of what will and will not work to motivate people to take risks and demonstrating that your conclusion did not follow from it.
That’s at best an argument against the political viability of iterated straw drawing due to general irrationality, not against the rationality of iterated straw drawing itself. The pilots are definitely worse of when everyone is sent to their death. If the pilots opinions don’t matter sending them all to their death is the best option since it saves training costs. If a compromise acceptable to the pilots need to be found then iterated straw drawing is the best option for everyone for any possible mission count and any gived cadre size, provided the pilots can make the necessary precommitment. Command might possibly reject this compromise due to some pilots appearing to be freeloading, but would act irrationally in doing so.
Of course doing the straw drawing at an earlier stage and optimizing training for whether they are going to be sent to their death or not would be even more efficient, but that level of precommitment seems less psychologically plausible.
The problem is, pilots aren’t optimizing for overall survival. Somebody who wanted to live to see the end of the war, at all costs, could’ve just faked some medical problem and gotten themselves a desk job. The perceived-reproductive-fitness boost associated with being a member of the flight crew is contingent on actually flying (and making it back alive, of course). In simpler terms, nobody gets laid by drawing the long straw.
That’s your third completely unconnected argument, and this one doesn’t make Japan and return missions assuming viability of straw drawing rational either. Even if the pilots are rationally maximizing some combination of survival and military glory that doesn’t mean Japan bombing and return missions with most of the load devoted to fuel are an efficient way to gain it. You could have all pilots volunteering to be part of the draw for one way missions and those who draw long being reassigned to Europe or whereever they can earn glory more fuel efficiently.
You’re assuming that straw drawing is viable. I’m trying to show why it wasn’t.
You seem to have a theory, based on that invalid assumption, about what will and will not work to motivate people to take risks. Does that theory make any useful predictions in this case?
Then you are wasting everyones time, we already know that it wasn’t viable. It was suggested and rejected. The whole discussion was about a) what would be needed to make viable (e. g. sufficiently high rationality level and sufficiently strong precommitment) and b) whether it would be the rational thing to do given the requirements.
No. I was taking your model of what will and will not work to motivate people to take risks and demonstrating that your conclusion did not follow from it.