Is there yet another cognitive mode for general-sum game theory? I suspect so. I think I’ve seen several times that the purely cooperative case (which might be like the “decision theory” case here) and the purely competitive case (“zero sum” here) have tractable analyses, but questions of general games are open. I ran into this in multi-agent RL (though I’m not sure if it is still the case—I was looking at older papers).
This makes sense: it is easier to assume someone is either with you or against you than to navigate complicated preferences.
In terms of computational complexity, finding Nash equilibria is PPAD complete, but I can’t say anything about what that means for the story here.
Is there yet another cognitive mode for general-sum game theory? I suspect so. I think I’ve seen several times that the purely cooperative case (which might be like the “decision theory” case here) and the purely competitive case (“zero sum” here) have tractable analyses, but questions of general games are open. I ran into this in multi-agent RL (though I’m not sure if it is still the case—I was looking at older papers).
This makes sense: it is easier to assume someone is either with you or against you than to navigate complicated preferences.
In terms of computational complexity, finding Nash equilibria is PPAD complete, but I can’t say anything about what that means for the story here.
Mention a recent interesting work here: On the Complexity of Computing Markov Perfect Equilibrium in General-Sum Stochastic Games gave a related analysis on the comuting of Markov PE for RL agents.