[note: I suspect we mostly agree on the impropriety of open selling and dissemination of this data. This is a narrow objection to the IMO hyperbolic focus on government assault risks. ]
I’m unhappy with the phrasing of “targeted by the Chinese government”, which IMO implies violence or other real-world interventions when the major threats are “adversary use of AI-enabled capabilities in disinformation and influence operations.” Thanks for mentioning blackmail—that IS a risk I put in the first category, and presumably becomes more possible with phone location data. I don’t know how much it matters, but there is probably a margin where it does.
I don’t disagree that this purchasable data makes advertising much more effective (in fact, I worked at a company based on this for some time). I only mean to say that “targeting” in the sense of disinformation campaigns is a very different level of threat from “targeting” of individuals for government ops.
This is a narrow objection to the IMO hyperbolic focus on government assault risks.
Whether or not you face government assault risks depends on what you do. Most people don’t face government assault risks. Some people engage in work or activism that results in them having government assault risks.
The Chinese government has strategic goals and most people are unimportant to those. Some people however work on topics like AI policy in which the Chinese government has an interest.
[note: I suspect we mostly agree on the impropriety of open selling and dissemination of this data. This is a narrow objection to the IMO hyperbolic focus on government assault risks. ]
I’m unhappy with the phrasing of “targeted by the Chinese government”, which IMO implies violence or other real-world interventions when the major threats are “adversary use of AI-enabled capabilities in disinformation and influence operations.” Thanks for mentioning blackmail—that IS a risk I put in the first category, and presumably becomes more possible with phone location data. I don’t know how much it matters, but there is probably a margin where it does.
I don’t disagree that this purchasable data makes advertising much more effective (in fact, I worked at a company based on this for some time). I only mean to say that “targeting” in the sense of disinformation campaigns is a very different level of threat from “targeting” of individuals for government ops.
Whether or not you face government assault risks depends on what you do. Most people don’t face government assault risks. Some people engage in work or activism that results in them having government assault risks.
The Chinese government has strategic goals and most people are unimportant to those. Some people however work on topics like AI policy in which the Chinese government has an interest.