If by “ought” statements you mean the universally compelling truths of moral realism,
“universally compelling” is setting the bar extremely high. To set it a bit more reasonably: there are moral facts if there is evidence or argument a rational agent would agree with.
Fair enough. But that “compelling” wasn’t so much about compelled agreement, and more about compelled action (“intrinsically motivating”, as they say). It’s impressive if all rational agents agree that murder is bad, but it doesn’t have the same oomph if this has no effect on their actions re: murder.
Compelled action is setting the bar much to high as well. We don’t expect humans to do the right thing on the basis of rational persuasion alone, we also have punishments and rewards.
“universally compelling” is setting the bar extremely high. To set it a bit more reasonably: there are moral facts if there is evidence or argument a rational agent would agree with.
Fair enough. But that “compelling” wasn’t so much about compelled agreement, and more about compelled action (“intrinsically motivating”, as they say). It’s impressive if all rational agents agree that murder is bad, but it doesn’t have the same oomph if this has no effect on their actions re: murder.
Compelled action is setting the bar much to high as well. We don’t expect humans to do the right thing on the basis of rational persuasion alone, we also have punishments and rewards.