If a reasonable agent expects itself to perform some function satisfactorily, then according to that agent, that agent ought to perform that function satisfactorily.
[this] is somewhat subtle. If I use a fork as a tool, then I am applying an “ought” to the fork; I expect it ought to function as an eating utensil. Similar to using another person as a tool (alternatively “employee” or “service worker”), giving them commands and expecting that they ought to follow them.
Can you taboo ought? I think I could rephrase these as:
I am trying to use a fork as an eating utensil because I expect that if I do, it will function like I expect eating utensils to function.
I am giving a person commands because I expect that if I do, they will follow my commands. (Which is what I want.)
More generally, there’s probably a difference between oughts like “I ought to do X” and oughts that could be rephrased in terms of conditionals, e.g.
“I believe there’s a plate in front of me because my visual system is a reliable producer of visual knowledge about the world.”
to
“Conditional on my visual system being a reliable producer of visual knowledge about the world, I believe there’s a plate in front of me and because I believe a very high credence in the latter, I have a similarly high credence in the former.”
It’s an expectation that has to do with a function of the thing, an expectation that the thing will function for some purpose. I suppose you could decompose that kind of claim to a more complex claim that doesn’t involve “function”, but in practice this is difficult.
I guess my main point is that sometimes fulfilling one’s functions is necessary for knowledge, e.g. you need to check proofs correctly to have the knowledge that the proofs you have checked are correct, the expectation that you check proofs correctly is connected with the behavior of checking them correctly.
Can you taboo ought? I think I could rephrase these as:
I am trying to use a fork as an eating utensil because I expect that if I do, it will function like I expect eating utensils to function.
I am giving a person commands because I expect that if I do, they will follow my commands. (Which is what I want.)
More generally, there’s probably a difference between oughts like “I ought to do X” and oughts that could be rephrased in terms of conditionals, e.g.
“I believe there’s a plate in front of me because my visual system is a reliable producer of visual knowledge about the world.”
to
“Conditional on my visual system being a reliable producer of visual knowledge about the world, I believe there’s a plate in front of me and because I believe a very high credence in the latter, I have a similarly high credence in the former.”
It’s an expectation that has to do with a function of the thing, an expectation that the thing will function for some purpose. I suppose you could decompose that kind of claim to a more complex claim that doesn’t involve “function”, but in practice this is difficult.
I guess my main point is that sometimes fulfilling one’s functions is necessary for knowledge, e.g. you need to check proofs correctly to have the knowledge that the proofs you have checked are correct, the expectation that you check proofs correctly is connected with the behavior of checking them correctly.