It’s much more like the second. I believe this to be very clearly true e.g. in the case of checking mathematical proofs.
I am using an interpretation of “should” under which an agent believes “I should X” iff they have a quasi-Fristonian set point of making “I do X” true. Should corresponds with “trying to make a thing happen”. It’s an internal rather than external motivation.
It is clear that you can’t justifiably believe that you have checked a mathematical proof without trying to make at least some things happen / trying to satisfy at least some constraints, e.g. trying to interpret mathematical notation correctly.
It’s much more like the second. I believe this to be very clearly true e.g. in the case of checking mathematical proofs.
I am using an interpretation of “should” under which an agent believes “I should X” iff they have a quasi-Fristonian set point of making “I do X” true. Should corresponds with “trying to make a thing happen”. It’s an internal rather than external motivation.
It is clear that you can’t justifiably believe that you have checked a mathematical proof without trying to make at least some things happen / trying to satisfy at least some constraints, e.g. trying to interpret mathematical notation correctly.