I guess I’m just still not sure what you expect the oughts to be doing.
I was assuming that the point was that “oughts” and “ises” aren’t completely disjoint, as a crude understanding of the “is-ought divide” might suggest.
I think one of the reasons people are poking holes or bringing up non-”ought”-compliant agents is that we expect humans to sometimes be non-compliant too. This goes back to my question of whether every agent has some oughts, or whether every (sufficiently smart/rational/etc) agent would be impacted by every ought. If you give me a big list of oughts, I’ll give you a big list of ways humans violate them.
If you assume something like moral realism, so that there is some list of “oughts” that are categorical, so that they don’t relate to specific kinds of agents or specific situations, then it is likely that humans are violating most of them.
But moral realism is hard to justify.
On the other hand, given the premises that
moral norms are just one kind of norm
norms are always ways of performing a function or achieving an end
then you can come up with a constructivist metaethics that avoids the pitfalls of nihilism, relativism and realism. (I think. No idea if that is what Jesicata is saying).
I was assuming that the point was that “oughts” and “ises” aren’t completely disjoint, as a crude understanding of the “is-ought divide” might suggest.
If you assume something like moral realism, so that there is some list of “oughts” that are categorical, so that they don’t relate to specific kinds of agents or specific situations, then it is likely that humans are violating most of them.
But moral realism is hard to justify.
On the other hand, given the premises that
moral norms are just one kind of norm
norms are always ways of performing a function or achieving an end
then you can come up with a constructivist metaethics that avoids the pitfalls of nihilism, relativism and realism. (I think. No idea if that is what Jesicata is saying).