What this means is that two such agents with incompatible notions of fairness can’t get all the way to the Pareto frontier, but the closer their notions of fairness are to each other, the closer they can get.
this is helpful for clarifying some thoughts. Thanks.
most collective action problems are bargaining problems.
I came to this conclusion and the nice thing about it is that it collapses a bunch of problems into the signaling landscape problem. (I don’t know if there’s an academic term for the prevailing state of the signaling landscape at a given time). The frustrating thing about the signaling landscape is that there’s a lot of security through obscurity (eg shibboleths).
I found these three papers highly useful, especially the first one
1. Statistical physics of human cooperation
2. Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review
3. Understanding and Addressing Cultural Variation in Costly Antisocial Punishment
this is helpful for clarifying some thoughts. Thanks.
I came to this conclusion and the nice thing about it is that it collapses a bunch of problems into the signaling landscape problem. (I don’t know if there’s an academic term for the prevailing state of the signaling landscape at a given time). The frustrating thing about the signaling landscape is that there’s a lot of security through obscurity (eg shibboleths).
Going through these now. I started with #3. It’s astoundingly interesting. Thank you.