Setting aside (for the moment) the question of whether the world actually is moral or not, how could adding God possibly help?
The notion that God’s command is the source of morality is untenable due to the Euthyphro Dilemma: Is what is morally good commanded by God because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by God? Both answers have problems.
If it’s the former, then the good is a principle independent of God. Accepting that horn means we’d have to accept the possibility of the “godless moral world”. We’re done.
If it’s the latter, then isn’t what is “good” completely arbitrary? The good is whatever God decides it is at the moment. Think about what this means. If God decreed that something you considered evil now were good, then it would be so! God could command you to rape your children to death and eat them for breakfast. And this would be morally right, your feelings be damned! Not because of any other reason! Not because it served some greater utilitarian purpose; because God said so, full stop.
But then what possible bearing could your “gut-level” intuitions have on morality? To take the latter horn, you must give up your gut-level intuitions. You can’t have them. And without them, why is your “moral” gut still an obstacle to thinking God couldn’t exist?
Some have tried to thread the needle saying that it’s the latter horn, but this isn’t really arbitrary because the good is identical to God’s nature. This doesn’t help. It just pushes the question back a step:
Does God possess whatever “good” properties like loving-kindness, impartiality, and generosity (etc.) in his nature because they are good? Or are they good because God possesses them in his nature?
Again, if it’s the former, good properties are independent of God. Accepting that horn means we’d have to accept the possibility of the “godless moral world”. We’re done.
If it’s the latter, then it must be that if God exists, wherever humans express these good properties can be called good and if God does not exist, this exact same situation cannot be called good.
For example two humans’ love for each other. This expression of love has the same basic motivations behind it, and the same effects on both parties if God exists or not. Is it morally intuitive on a “gut level” why the former case is good and the latter case isn’t? Then why is your “moral” gut still an obstacle to thinking a moral world without God couldn’t exist? Same problem.
Setting aside (for the moment) the question of whether the world actually is moral or not, how could adding God possibly help?
The notion that God’s command is the source of morality is untenable due to the Euthyphro Dilemma: Is what is morally good commanded by God because it is morally good, or is it morally good because it is commanded by God? Both answers have problems.
If it’s the former, then the good is a principle independent of God. Accepting that horn means we’d have to accept the possibility of the “godless moral world”. We’re done.
If it’s the latter, then isn’t what is “good” completely arbitrary? The good is whatever God decides it is at the moment. Think about what this means. If God decreed that something you considered evil now were good, then it would be so! God could command you to rape your children to death and eat them for breakfast. And this would be morally right, your feelings be damned! Not because of any other reason! Not because it served some greater utilitarian purpose; because God said so, full stop.
But then what possible bearing could your “gut-level” intuitions have on morality? To take the latter horn, you must give up your gut-level intuitions. You can’t have them. And without them, why is your “moral” gut still an obstacle to thinking God couldn’t exist?
Some have tried to thread the needle saying that it’s the latter horn, but this isn’t really arbitrary because the good is identical to God’s nature. This doesn’t help. It just pushes the question back a step:
Does God possess whatever “good” properties like loving-kindness, impartiality, and generosity (etc.) in his nature because they are good? Or are they good because God possesses them in his nature?
Again, if it’s the former, good properties are independent of God. Accepting that horn means we’d have to accept the possibility of the “godless moral world”. We’re done.
If it’s the latter, then it must be that if God exists, wherever humans express these good properties can be called good and if God does not exist, this exact same situation cannot be called good.
For example two humans’ love for each other. This expression of love has the same basic motivations behind it, and the same effects on both parties if God exists or not. Is it morally intuitive on a “gut level” why the former case is good and the latter case isn’t? Then why is your “moral” gut still an obstacle to thinking a moral world without God couldn’t exist? Same problem.