If you are trying to violate someone’s rights, then your contextually relevant rights are forfeited. For example, the Nazi has forfeited the right not to be lied to.
I assume you can waive the right to abolish an agreement at will, too? That’s the foundation of contract law, but I don’t want to assume.
I’m not sure I understand.
What is this “don’t be a dick” function, and what place does it hold?
Well, some people are motivated to avoid being dicks, and might value information about how to do it. It’s not very ontologically special.
… what’s “prudence” in your nomenclature? I haven’t seen the term as you use it.
To me, it looks like consequentialists do prudence exclusively, and name it “morality”, instead of actually doing any morality. Prudence is arranging for things to be how you would like them to be.
If you are trying to violate someone’s rights, then your contextually relevant rights are forfeited. For example, the Nazi has forfeited the right not to be lied to.
Yes, I know. Hence my question:
You’ve said that you will do nothing, rather than violate a right in order to prevent other rights being violated. Yet you also say that people attempting to violate rights waive their rights not to be stopped. Is this rule designed for the purpose of allowing you to violate people’s rights in order to protect others? That seems unfair to people in situations where there’s no clearly identifiable moustache-twirling villain.
You see?
I’m not sure I understand.
Can I waive my right to un-waive a right? For example, if I waive my right not to work for someone, can I also waive my right to change my mind? As in, a standard contract?
I would assume so, but hey, it can’t hurt to ask.
Well, some people are motivated to avoid being dicks, and might value information about how to do it. It’s not very ontologically special.
Are you, personally, motivated to discourage dickish behaviour? You are, right? You mentioned you would sue someone for being a dick to you, if it were illegal, even if it was perfectly moral for them to do so.
To me, it looks like consequentialists do prudence exclusively, and name it “morality”, instead of actually doing any morality. Prudence is arranging for things to be how you would like them to be.
… as long as “how you would like them to be” doesn’t violate any rights. I think I see what you mean by that.
… ah, and “how you would like things to be” includes “no dickishness”, right?
I do not see; can you start that line of inquiry over completely for me?
Can I waive my right to un-waive a right?
I haven’t actually thought about this before, but my instinct is no. Although if you arrange for it to be really hard to communicate a change of mind, someone who went by their last communication with you might not be doing anything wrong, just making a sincere mistake.
Are you, personally, motivated to discourage dickish behaviour?
I try to minimize it from and around myself. I am not on a Global Dickishness Reduction Campaign of any kind. Maybe I should have said not that I’m not a consequentialist about it, but rather that I’m neither agent- nor recipient-neutral about it? How I would like things to be certainly refers to dickishness.
In cases where rights conflict, and there’s no alternative that doesn’t violate at least one, I privilege the null action. (I considered denying ought-implies-can, instead, but decided that committed me to the existence of moral luck and wasn’t okay.) “The null action” is the one where you don’t do anything.
You also say that attackers lose their contextually relevant rights, so you can violate their rights in order to defend others.
My original question was, doesn’t that feel like a patch to allow you to act like a consequentialist when it’s clear you have to?
Isn’t that unfair to people in situations where there is no attacker for you to focus on, where relieving their suffering is not a matter of taking out a convenient target?
Also, I just realized this, but doesn’t that mean you should be really concerned about any laws punishing things that don’t violate rights, since those criminals haven’t waived their rights under your system? For example, suing someone for violating your “right to privacy” by publicising a photo taken of you in a public place.
I haven’t actually thought about this before, but my instinct is no.
Huh. This universal right to change your mind about commitments seems like the most radical part of your philosophy (although obviously, you’re more tentative about endorsing it) - I noticed you endorsed the right of private individuals to secede from the state.
I am not on a Global Dickishness Reduction Campaign of any kind.
Yeah, you mentioned being a sort of virtue ethicist here … you would vote for (prudent) anti-dickishness laws, that sort of thing?
My original question was, doesn’t that feel like a patch to allow you to act like a consequentialist when it’s clear you have to?
No. It doesn’t feel consequentialist to me at all. It’s a patch, but it’s not a consequentialist-flavored patch.
Isn’t that unfair to people in situations where there is no attacker for you to focus on, where relieving their suffering is not a matter of taking out a convenient target?
Example?
Also, I just realized this, but doesn’t that mean you should be really concerned about any laws punishing things that don’t violate rights, since those criminals haven’t waived their rights under your system? For example, suing someone for violating your “right to privacy” by publicising a photo taken of you in a public place.
I am concerned about that, see elsewhere re: guaranteed exit, consent of the governed, etc. etc. blah blah blah.
you would vote for (prudent) anti-dickishness laws, that sort of thing?
If you specify that something’s prudent I’m pretty likely to vote for it even if it doesn’t affect dickishness in particular. Yay, prudence!
No. It doesn’t feel consequentialist to me at all. It’s a patch, but it’s not a consequentialist-flavored patch.
Yeah, I didn’t understand your position as well when I asked that.
Isn’t that unfair to people in situations where there is no attacker for you to focus on, where relieving their suffering is not a matter of taking out a convenient target?
Example?
How about tragedies of the commons, for example?
Also, I just realized this, but doesn’t that mean you should be really concerned about any laws punishing things that don’t violate rights, since those criminals haven’t waived their rights under your system? For example, suing someone for violating your “right to privacy” by publicising a photo taken of you in a public place.
I am concerned about that, see elsewhere re: guaranteed exit, consent of the governed, etc. etc. blah blah blah.
Most countries do not allow criminals to escape punishment by revoking their consent to be punished.
If you specify that something’s prudent I’m pretty likely to vote for it even if it doesn’t affect dickishness in particular. Yay, prudence!
Hmm, good point. Effective anti-dickishness, laws, then. (Not that I expect you to change your answer.)
Tragedies of the commons are a coordination problem. My system can cover them if there’s some kind of complex ownership or promise-keeping involved, but doesn’t handle implicit commonses.
Most countries do not allow criminals to escape punishment by revoking their consent to be punished.
Yeah, I’m aware.
I would vote for effective anti-dickishness laws all else being equal but might prioritize reduced dickishness below other things if there were tradeoffs involved.
Tragedies of the commons are a coordination problem. My system can cover them if there’s some kind of complex ownership or promise-keeping involved, but doesn’t handle implicit commonses.
Well, fair enough, as long as you’re aware of it.
Most countries do not allow criminals to escape punishment by revoking their consent to be punished.
Yeah, I’m aware.
I would vote for effective anti-dickishness laws all else being equal but might prioritize reduced dickishness below other things if there were tradeoffs involved.
So isn’t there an inconsistency here? Any law punishing something merely dickish, rather than rights violations, is itself a rights violation … right? Or can large-scale prudence outweigh a few minor rights violations?
ETA: That seems reasonable, honestly; even if it does taint the purity of your deontological rules, it only becomes important when determining large-scale policies, which is when you’d want a more precise accounting to shut up and multiply with.
Any law punishing something merely dickish, rather than rights violations, is itself a rights violation … right?
Blah blah guarantee of exit yada yada consent of the governed blah blah I’m really sick now of re-explaining that I am aware of the tensions in my view when it comes to governance and I’m not going to do it anymore.
Alicorn, you just acknowledged that most people being punished are not asked whether they consent to it.
Indeed, attempting to use one’s “guarantee of exit” in these situations is often itself a crime, and one carrying punishments you classify as “rights violations” if I understand you correctly.
That’s sort of why I commented on the potential issues this introduces?
People in the real world do not have guarantee of exit. I’m aware of that. I’ve been over this topic elsewhere in thread more times than I wish to have been.
So … I’m sorry, are you saying you’re actually against these laws, but where rather saying that you would be in favour of them in an ideal world? I appear to have misunderstood you somewhat, so perhaps these repetitions and rephrasing are not in vain.
Thank you for your patience, I know how frustrating it is dealing with inferential gaps and the illusion of clarity better than most :)
It has run out. There is no more patience. It has joined the choir invisible. I said so a couple comments upstream and got downvoted for it; please don’t ask me again.
Well, fair enough. While I’m disappointed not to be able to further improve my understanding of your beliefs, I treasure the LessWrong custom of tapping out of conversations that are no longer productive.
Have a nice day, and may you continue to improve your own understanding of such matters :)
(I think you were actually downvoted for missing the point of my response, by the way. I certainly hope that’s the reason. It would be a great shame if people started downvoting for “tapping out” statements.)
If you are trying to violate someone’s rights, then your contextually relevant rights are forfeited. For example, the Nazi has forfeited the right not to be lied to.
I’m not sure I understand.
Well, some people are motivated to avoid being dicks, and might value information about how to do it. It’s not very ontologically special.
To me, it looks like consequentialists do prudence exclusively, and name it “morality”, instead of actually doing any morality. Prudence is arranging for things to be how you would like them to be.
Yes, I know. Hence my question:
You see?
Can I waive my right to un-waive a right? For example, if I waive my right not to work for someone, can I also waive my right to change my mind? As in, a standard contract?
I would assume so, but hey, it can’t hurt to ask.
Are you, personally, motivated to discourage dickish behaviour? You are, right? You mentioned you would sue someone for being a dick to you, if it were illegal, even if it was perfectly moral for them to do so.
… as long as “how you would like them to be” doesn’t violate any rights. I think I see what you mean by that.
… ah, and “how you would like things to be” includes “no dickishness”, right?
I do not see; can you start that line of inquiry over completely for me?
I haven’t actually thought about this before, but my instinct is no. Although if you arrange for it to be really hard to communicate a change of mind, someone who went by their last communication with you might not be doing anything wrong, just making a sincere mistake.
I try to minimize it from and around myself. I am not on a Global Dickishness Reduction Campaign of any kind. Maybe I should have said not that I’m not a consequentialist about it, but rather that I’m neither agent- nor recipient-neutral about it? How I would like things to be certainly refers to dickishness.
Sure, I can rephrase.
You’ve said:
You also say that attackers lose their contextually relevant rights, so you can violate their rights in order to defend others.
My original question was, doesn’t that feel like a patch to allow you to act like a consequentialist when it’s clear you have to?
Isn’t that unfair to people in situations where there is no attacker for you to focus on, where relieving their suffering is not a matter of taking out a convenient target?
Also, I just realized this, but doesn’t that mean you should be really concerned about any laws punishing things that don’t violate rights, since those criminals haven’t waived their rights under your system? For example, suing someone for violating your “right to privacy” by publicising a photo taken of you in a public place.
Huh. This universal right to change your mind about commitments seems like the most radical part of your philosophy (although obviously, you’re more tentative about endorsing it) - I noticed you endorsed the right of private individuals to secede from the state.
Yeah, you mentioned being a sort of virtue ethicist here … you would vote for (prudent) anti-dickishness laws, that sort of thing?
No. It doesn’t feel consequentialist to me at all. It’s a patch, but it’s not a consequentialist-flavored patch.
Example?
I am concerned about that, see elsewhere re: guaranteed exit, consent of the governed, etc. etc. blah blah blah.
If you specify that something’s prudent I’m pretty likely to vote for it even if it doesn’t affect dickishness in particular. Yay, prudence!
Yeah, I didn’t understand your position as well when I asked that.
How about tragedies of the commons, for example?
Most countries do not allow criminals to escape punishment by revoking their consent to be punished.
Hmm, good point. Effective anti-dickishness, laws, then. (Not that I expect you to change your answer.)
Tragedies of the commons are a coordination problem. My system can cover them if there’s some kind of complex ownership or promise-keeping involved, but doesn’t handle implicit commonses.
Yeah, I’m aware.
I would vote for effective anti-dickishness laws all else being equal but might prioritize reduced dickishness below other things if there were tradeoffs involved.
Well, fair enough, as long as you’re aware of it.
So isn’t there an inconsistency here? Any law punishing something merely dickish, rather than rights violations, is itself a rights violation … right? Or can large-scale prudence outweigh a few minor rights violations?
ETA: That seems reasonable, honestly; even if it does taint the purity of your deontological rules, it only becomes important when determining large-scale policies, which is when you’d want a more precise accounting to shut up and multiply with.
Blah blah guarantee of exit yada yada consent of the governed blah blah I’m really sick now of re-explaining that I am aware of the tensions in my view when it comes to governance and I’m not going to do it anymore.
Alicorn, you just acknowledged that most people being punished are not asked whether they consent to it.
Indeed, attempting to use one’s “guarantee of exit” in these situations is often itself a crime, and one carrying punishments you classify as “rights violations” if I understand you correctly.
That’s sort of why I commented on the potential issues this introduces?
People in the real world do not have guarantee of exit. I’m aware of that. I’ve been over this topic elsewhere in thread more times than I wish to have been.
So … I’m sorry, are you saying you’re actually against these laws, but where rather saying that you would be in favour of them in an ideal world? I appear to have misunderstood you somewhat, so perhaps these repetitions and rephrasing are not in vain.
Thank you for your patience, I know how frustrating it is dealing with inferential gaps and the illusion of clarity better than most :)
It has run out. There is no more patience. It has joined the choir invisible. I said so a couple comments upstream and got downvoted for it; please don’t ask me again.
Well, fair enough. While I’m disappointed not to be able to further improve my understanding of your beliefs, I treasure the LessWrong custom of tapping out of conversations that are no longer productive.
Have a nice day, and may you continue to improve your own understanding of such matters :)
(I think you were actually downvoted for missing the point of my response, by the way. I certainly hope that’s the reason. It would be a great shame if people started downvoting for “tapping out” statements.)