All this needs the disclaimer that some domains should be lie-free zones. I value the truth and despise those who would corrupt intellectual discourse with lies.
Can anyone point me to a defense of corrupting intellectual discourse with lies (that doesn’t resolve into a two-tier model of elites or insiders for whom truth is required and masses/outsiders for whom it is not?) Obviously there is at least one really good reason why espousing such a viewpoint would be rare, but I assume that, by the law of large numbers, there’s probably an extant example somewhere.
Can we taboo “intellectual discourse”? As I think about your question I realize that I’m not sure I understand what that phrase is being used to refer to in this context.
So, I think “a defense of corrupting intellectual discourse with lies” collapses into looking for a defense of lying more generally… would you agree? I’m not trying to put words in your mouth, just trying to make sure I’ve understood you.
I’m trying to take the idea of not lying in science journals and broaden it to include fields other than science, and public discussion in places other than journals. A specific example would be Christian apologist William Lane Craig (who I’ve been following long enough to become convinced that the falsehoods he tells are too systematic to all be a matter of self-deception.)
Do you believe that Sokal was immoral when he wrote his famous paper? There are people who suggest that Bem wrote his latest famous paper for the same reason.
If you think that the system is inherently flawed and corrupt and has no error correction build in, the strategy of placing lies into the system to make it blow up makes sense.
Do you believe that Sokal was immoral when he wrote his famous paper? There are people who suggest that Bem wrote his latest famous paper for the same reason.
Daryl Bem? I think people suggesting Bem isn’t being serious (though sadly mistaken) haven’t talk to him. If Bem is trying to do something like Sokal, he has been doing an Andy Kaufman level job of trolling for many years now.
Daryl Bem? I think people suggesting Bem isn’t being serious (though sadly mistaken) haven’t talk to him.
I think I remember reading that sentiment from someone who’s a student with him on a blog. Bem is certainly deeply serious about his belief that the academia is full of hypocrites.
Even if Bem does belief in psi he’s not as stupid as believing that the data he gathered for that paper proves that psi really exists. But if he can use that data to show how deeply wrong academia happens to be and shake up academia from his perspective maybe academics start to take data more seriously.
To the extends that he beliefs taking data seriously leads to believing in psi shaking up academia serves that agenda.
In a world full of pseudoskeptics someone who’s serious about evidence gets annoyed at pseudoskeptics. To the extend that you don’t mentally distinguish pseudoskeptics from the real thing, it’s hard to understand people like Bem.
I’m enough like Bem in that regard to feel with him. I’m the kind of person who goes on skeptic exchange to write a question asking for whether there evidence that supports the core assumptions of evidence-based medicine and have the highest upvoted answer be for a year a answer opposing evidence-based medicine.
Part of the trick was to take the most authoritative source as definition for evidence-based medicine and that source actually puts up a strawman that nobody in their right mind would defend at depth.
I’m deeply troubled when I read people saying that the evidence for climate change is comparable to the evidence for evolution because I think the evidence for evolution is pretty certain and better with p<<0.0000001 and climate change isn’t in that reference class. I’m serious enough about evidence to find that claim a big lie that offends me, especially when made in highly authoritative venues.
Bem is deeply serious but that paper is him saying: “Even if I play by your strange and hypocritical rules of “evidence”, I still can provide “evidence” that psi exists. Take that.” I think that the data he measured is real but I don’t think that he thinks the data of that particular experiment proves that psi is real. He might or might not believe that psi is real, I don’t know.
It a different kind of lie to lie by following the rules to the letter then to lie that evolution and climate change in the same reference class but both are lies. Both aren’t about telling the truth as is.
So you are bringing up a whole lot of unrelated, or only loosely linked ideas. I’ll be honest, such a long reply of (at best) loosely connected ideas pattern matches to “axe-to-grind” for me, so I strongly considered not bothering with this post. As it is, lets limit the scope to discussing Bem.
Anyway, what exactly do you believe Bem is doing with his paper? I assumed the claim in your first post is that Bem was publishing silly results to highlight the danger of deifying p-values (as Sokal published a silly paper to highlight the low standards of the journal he submitted to). I contend this is not true, and Bem believes the following (based on interviews, the focuses of Bem’s work, and a personal conversation with him):
psi is a real phenomena
ganzfeld experiments (as interpreted through standard statistical significance tests) are strong evidence for psi
“Feeling the Future” and other similar experiments are evidence for precognition
I contend all of these beliefs are mistaken.
In response to further claims you’ve made regarding the academic response to Bem, I further contend:
the academic community is right to be skeptical of such work, and in fact its a sort of informal Bayesian filter.
the academic response raised valid statistical objections to Bem’s work
The biggest problem I see is that an effect has to have as ludicrously small a prior as Bem’s before proper scrutiny is applied. Lots of small effect that warrant closer methodological scrutiny slip through the cracks.
So you are bringing up a whole lot of unrelated, or only loosely linked ideas. I’ll be honest, such a long reply of (at best) loosely connected ideas pattern matches to “axe-to-grind” for me
I don’t think that you can understand the position of people who fundamentally disagree with by reading a single paragraph. Yes, you can find easily a position where they seem to have another opinion than you do, but that doesn’t mean that you understand what they actually believe.
Anyway, what exactly do you believe Bem is doing with his paper?
Bem thinks that academic science is generally not taking the data of their experiments seriously and therefore coming to wrong conclusions in all sorts of domains.
Sokal thinks that the literature department can’t tell true from false. Bem thinks the same is true of the psychology department. He thinks it lacks the same ability.
Sokal is not highliting some specific issue of how one technique that the literature department is using is wrong. His critique of the literature department is more fundamental.
The same goes for Bem. Bem doesn’t just think that academic psychology is wrong on one issue but that it’s flawed on a more fundamental level.
3.”Feeling the Future” and other similar experiments are evidence for precognition
Any good Bayesian holds that belief. If you look at a Lesswrong defence on what people learned from becoming Bayesian you will find:
Banish talk like “There is absolutely no evidence for that belief”. P(E | H) > P(E) if and only if P(H | E) > P(H). The fact that there are myths about Zeus is evidence that Zeus exists. Zeus’s existing would make it more likely for myths about him to arise, so the arising of myths about him must make it more likely that he exists.
There are a lot of people in academia who don’t hold that belief and who aren’t good Bayesians. Bem is completely on the right side on that point.
I don’t think that you can understand the position of people who fundamentally disagree with by reading a single paragraph.
I didn’t claim to. What I claim in what you quoted is that dragging in a concept like evidenced based medicine and climate science isn’t going to help anything in a discussion of Bem’s paper.
Bem thinks that academic science is generally not taking the data of their experiments seriously and therefore coming to wrong conclusions in all sorts of domains.
I would phrase this differently. Bem believes that an informal Bayesian filter (extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence) is causing academic psychology to unfairly conclude that psi phenomena aren’t real. He wants us to ignore the incredibly low prior for psi, and use weak but statistically significant effects to push us to “psi is probable.”
I don’t agree with this, as I’ve hopefully made clear.
Any good Bayesian holds that belief.
Not necessarily true- a good Bayesian who has read the paper could conclude the methodology is flawed enough that its not much evidence of anything (which was also largely the academic psychology response). I believe the methodology of “Feeling the Future” was so flawed that it isn’t evidence for anything. The replication attempts that failed further reinforce this belief.
Bem believes that an informal Bayesian filter (extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence)
Bem does not believe that most researchers really follow extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. He believes that many of the relevant researches won’t be convinced regardles of what evidence is provided.
He might be wrong about that belief but saying that he believes that most researchers would be convinced be reasonable data misunderstands Bem.
methodology is flawed enough that its not much evidence of anything
Not much evidence and no evidence are two different things. If he believes it’s evidence and you don’t he’s right. It might not be much evidence but it’s evidence in the bayesian sense.
If you debate with him in person and pretend it’s no evidence he will continue to say it’s evidence and be right. That will prevent the discussion to come to the questions that actually matter of how strong the evidence happens to be.
The replication attempts that failed further reinforce this belief.
At university we did a failed attempt to replicate PCR. It really made the postdoc who was running the experiement ashamed that she couldn’t get it right and that it failed for some reason unknown to her. In no way does this concludes that PCR doesn’t work.
As far as replication goes Bem also seems to think that there were successful replication attempts:
What Wiseman never tells people is in Ritchie, Wiseman and French is that his online registry where he asked everyone to register, first of all he provided a deadline date. I don’t know of any serious researcher working on their own stuff who is going to drop everything and immediately do a replication… anyway, he and Ritchie and French published these three studies. Well, they knew that there were three other studies that had been submitted and completed and two of the three showed statistically significant results replicating my results.
If you have a very strange effect that you don’t understand and can’t pin down having 2 of 6 replication attempts be successful does not really prove that there no effect.
If something can go wrong and a method like PCR that’s done millions of times fails to replicated without knowledgeable people knowing why, failing to replicate a very new effect doesn’t mean much. Trying to pin down the difference between the 2 successful and the 4 failed replication attempts might be in order. At least that where I would focus my attention when I’m not attached to the outcome. It may very well turn out that there no real effect in the end but there seems to be more than nothing.
From the same interview of Bem I linked to above (but by the moderator):
How ironic that would be, since one of the strategies of the debunkers has long been to psychologize the phenomena and say, “We don’t need to study the phenomena. We need to study these weird people who report and believe these weird things.” Wouldn’t it be ironic if it turns out we need to look at the beliefs and psychology of the experimenters and why they don’t believe and why they don’t get these effects.
Again that not that much different from the way Sokal sees the literature department.
Here’s something. It’s not a defense of lying, but I do think it’s an example of advocating lying that does not resolve into elites versus outsiders in an essay by Gould: 1234. It ends with
Say it five times before breakfast tomorrow
which I read as advocating that the reader indoctrinate himself with the belief. I don’t think it’s clear whether he thinks it true or false, just too consequential to leave to the facts. This isn’t an exhortation to indoctrinate the masses with lies, but for the reader should to first indoctrinate himself.
I think that this is a common pattern.
It’s possible that I’m reading this wrong. Perhaps it is a coded message of esoteric knowledge and elites are supposed to know better than the indoctrinate themselves. Indeed, that could apply to any example along these lines.
Or perhaps I’m reading too much into those words and they aren’t meant to be indoctrination at all. Some nearby passages that argue against that:
more important, understand it as the center of a network of implication
A few well-placed mottoes might serve as our best antidotes against those deeply ingrained habits of Western thought that so constrain us because we do not recognize them
For anyone else, the object level of the essay came up here (though perhaps for the meta level of another debate). I do think it is a good essay.
Can anyone point me to a defense of corrupting intellectual discourse with lies (that doesn’t resolve into a two-tier model of elites or insiders for whom truth is required and masses/outsiders for whom it is not?) Obviously there is at least one really good reason why espousing such a viewpoint would be rare, but I assume that, by the law of large numbers, there’s probably an extant example somewhere.
Can we taboo “intellectual discourse”? As I think about your question I realize that I’m not sure I understand what that phrase is being used to refer to in this context.
For present purposes, I suppose it includes any domain including the defense of lying itself.
So, I think “a defense of corrupting intellectual discourse with lies” collapses into looking for a defense of lying more generally… would you agree? I’m not trying to put words in your mouth, just trying to make sure I’ve understood you.
I’m trying to take the idea of not lying in science journals and broaden it to include fields other than science, and public discussion in places other than journals. A specific example would be Christian apologist William Lane Craig (who I’ve been following long enough to become convinced that the falsehoods he tells are too systematic to all be a matter of self-deception.)
Do you believe that Sokal was immoral when he wrote his famous paper? There are people who suggest that Bem wrote his latest famous paper for the same reason.
If you think that the system is inherently flawed and corrupt and has no error correction build in, the strategy of placing lies into the system to make it blow up makes sense.
Daryl Bem? I think people suggesting Bem isn’t being serious (though sadly mistaken) haven’t talk to him. If Bem is trying to do something like Sokal, he has been doing an Andy Kaufman level job of trolling for many years now.
I think I remember reading that sentiment from someone who’s a student with him on a blog. Bem is certainly deeply serious about his belief that the academia is full of hypocrites.
Even if Bem does belief in psi he’s not as stupid as believing that the data he gathered for that paper proves that psi really exists. But if he can use that data to show how deeply wrong academia happens to be and shake up academia from his perspective maybe academics start to take data more seriously. To the extends that he beliefs taking data seriously leads to believing in psi shaking up academia serves that agenda.
In a world full of pseudoskeptics someone who’s serious about evidence gets annoyed at pseudoskeptics. To the extend that you don’t mentally distinguish pseudoskeptics from the real thing, it’s hard to understand people like Bem.
I’m enough like Bem in that regard to feel with him. I’m the kind of person who goes on skeptic exchange to write a question asking for whether there evidence that supports the core assumptions of evidence-based medicine and have the highest upvoted answer be for a year a answer opposing evidence-based medicine.
Part of the trick was to take the most authoritative source as definition for evidence-based medicine and that source actually puts up a strawman that nobody in their right mind would defend at depth.
I’m deeply troubled when I read people saying that the evidence for climate change is comparable to the evidence for evolution because I think the evidence for evolution is pretty certain and better with p<<0.0000001 and climate change isn’t in that reference class. I’m serious enough about evidence to find that claim a big lie that offends me, especially when made in highly authoritative venues.
Bem is deeply serious but that paper is him saying: “Even if I play by your strange and hypocritical rules of “evidence”, I still can provide “evidence” that psi exists. Take that.” I think that the data he measured is real but I don’t think that he thinks the data of that particular experiment proves that psi is real. He might or might not believe that psi is real, I don’t know.
It a different kind of lie to lie by following the rules to the letter then to lie that evolution and climate change in the same reference class but both are lies. Both aren’t about telling the truth as is.
So you are bringing up a whole lot of unrelated, or only loosely linked ideas. I’ll be honest, such a long reply of (at best) loosely connected ideas pattern matches to “axe-to-grind” for me, so I strongly considered not bothering with this post. As it is, lets limit the scope to discussing Bem.
Anyway, what exactly do you believe Bem is doing with his paper? I assumed the claim in your first post is that Bem was publishing silly results to highlight the danger of deifying p-values (as Sokal published a silly paper to highlight the low standards of the journal he submitted to). I contend this is not true, and Bem believes the following (based on interviews, the focuses of Bem’s work, and a personal conversation with him):
psi is a real phenomena
ganzfeld experiments (as interpreted through standard statistical significance tests) are strong evidence for psi
“Feeling the Future” and other similar experiments are evidence for precognition
I contend all of these beliefs are mistaken.
In response to further claims you’ve made regarding the academic response to Bem, I further contend:
the academic community is right to be skeptical of such work, and in fact its a sort of informal Bayesian filter.
the academic response raised valid statistical objections to Bem’s work
The biggest problem I see is that an effect has to have as ludicrously small a prior as Bem’s before proper scrutiny is applied. Lots of small effect that warrant closer methodological scrutiny slip through the cracks.
I don’t think that you can understand the position of people who fundamentally disagree with by reading a single paragraph. Yes, you can find easily a position where they seem to have another opinion than you do, but that doesn’t mean that you understand what they actually believe.
Bem thinks that academic science is generally not taking the data of their experiments seriously and therefore coming to wrong conclusions in all sorts of domains.
Sokal thinks that the literature department can’t tell true from false. Bem thinks the same is true of the psychology department. He thinks it lacks the same ability.
Sokal is not highliting some specific issue of how one technique that the literature department is using is wrong. His critique of the literature department is more fundamental. The same goes for Bem. Bem doesn’t just think that academic psychology is wrong on one issue but that it’s flawed on a more fundamental level.
Any good Bayesian holds that belief. If you look at a Lesswrong defence on what people learned from becoming Bayesian you will find:
There are a lot of people in academia who don’t hold that belief and who aren’t good Bayesians. Bem is completely on the right side on that point.
I didn’t claim to. What I claim in what you quoted is that dragging in a concept like evidenced based medicine and climate science isn’t going to help anything in a discussion of Bem’s paper.
I would phrase this differently. Bem believes that an informal Bayesian filter (extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence) is causing academic psychology to unfairly conclude that psi phenomena aren’t real. He wants us to ignore the incredibly low prior for psi, and use weak but statistically significant effects to push us to “psi is probable.”
I don’t agree with this, as I’ve hopefully made clear.
Not necessarily true- a good Bayesian who has read the paper could conclude the methodology is flawed enough that its not much evidence of anything (which was also largely the academic psychology response). I believe the methodology of “Feeling the Future” was so flawed that it isn’t evidence for anything. The replication attempts that failed further reinforce this belief.
Bem does not believe that most researchers really follow extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. He believes that many of the relevant researches won’t be convinced regardles of what evidence is provided.
He might be wrong about that belief but saying that he believes that most researchers would be convinced be reasonable data misunderstands Bem.
Not much evidence and no evidence are two different things. If he believes it’s evidence and you don’t he’s right. It might not be much evidence but it’s evidence in the bayesian sense.
If you debate with him in person and pretend it’s no evidence he will continue to say it’s evidence and be right. That will prevent the discussion to come to the questions that actually matter of how strong the evidence happens to be.
At university we did a failed attempt to replicate PCR. It really made the postdoc who was running the experiement ashamed that she couldn’t get it right and that it failed for some reason unknown to her. In no way does this concludes that PCR doesn’t work.
As far as replication goes Bem also seems to think that there were successful replication attempts:
If you have a very strange effect that you don’t understand and can’t pin down having 2 of 6 replication attempts be successful does not really prove that there no effect. If something can go wrong and a method like PCR that’s done millions of times fails to replicated without knowledgeable people knowing why, failing to replicate a very new effect doesn’t mean much. Trying to pin down the difference between the 2 successful and the 4 failed replication attempts might be in order. At least that where I would focus my attention when I’m not attached to the outcome. It may very well turn out that there no real effect in the end but there seems to be more than nothing.
From the same interview of Bem I linked to above (but by the moderator):
Again that not that much different from the way Sokal sees the literature department.
Nevermind.
Here’s something. It’s not a defense of lying, but I do think it’s an example of advocating lying that does not resolve into elites versus outsiders in an essay by Gould: 1 2 3 4. It ends with
which I read as advocating that the reader indoctrinate himself with the belief. I don’t think it’s clear whether he thinks it true or false, just too consequential to leave to the facts. This isn’t an exhortation to indoctrinate the masses with lies, but for the reader should to first indoctrinate himself.
I think that this is a common pattern.
It’s possible that I’m reading this wrong. Perhaps it is a coded message of esoteric knowledge and elites are supposed to know better than the indoctrinate themselves. Indeed, that could apply to any example along these lines.
Or perhaps I’m reading too much into those words and they aren’t meant to be indoctrination at all. Some nearby passages that argue against that:
For anyone else, the object level of the essay came up here (though perhaps for the meta level of another debate). I do think it is a good essay.