I don’t quite understand what you mean. Even if we can agree on what “personhood” means (and I’ve argued extensively with people on the topic, so it’s possible that we won’t agree), what does it mean for a right to “drop out naturally” out personhood ? I don’t understand this process at all, nor do I understand the epistemology—how do you determine exactly which rights “drop out naturally”, and which ones do not ?
To use a trivial example, most deontologists would probably agree that something like “the right to not be arbitrarily killed by another person” should be on the list of rights that each person has. Most deontologists would probably also agree that something like “the right to possess three violet-blue glass marbles, each exactly 1cm in diameter” should not be on the list. But why ?
Likewise. For what it’s worth, though, I don’t actually think there is a good answer to the epistemological questions you asked; that’s one of the reasons I favor consequentialism rather than deontology. Of course, I imagine Alicorn’s views on the matter differ, so I, too, would like to see her answer (or that of any other deontologist who cares to respond).
I don’t quite understand what you mean. Even if we can agree on what “personhood” means (and I’ve argued extensively with people on the topic, so it’s possible that we won’t agree), what does it mean for a right to “drop out naturally” out personhood ? I don’t understand this process at all, nor do I understand the epistemology—how do you determine exactly which rights “drop out naturally”, and which ones do not ?
To use a trivial example, most deontologists would probably agree that something like “the right to not be arbitrarily killed by another person” should be on the list of rights that each person has. Most deontologists would probably also agree that something like “the right to possess three violet-blue glass marbles, each exactly 1cm in diameter” should not be on the list. But why ?
I think Alicorn’s answer concerned the ontological status of rights, not the epistemology thereof.
Understood, but I would like to understand both...
Likewise. For what it’s worth, though, I don’t actually think there is a good answer to the epistemological questions you asked; that’s one of the reasons I favor consequentialism rather than deontology. Of course, I imagine Alicorn’s views on the matter differ, so I, too, would like to see her answer (or that of any other deontologist who cares to respond).
As I mentioned here consequentialism has the same epistemological problem.
In another branch of this thread I’ve just walked through an assessment of whether a provided example contained a rights violation. Does that help?