Meh – there seems to me to be a lot of ambiguity about what ‘applauding’ is, or what purposes it serves (or is intended to serve), but still, I’m confused why you wrote:
don’t applaud when a growing potential tyrant does what you want
instead of just:
never applaud a growing potential tyrant
Certainly the rule isn’t:
only applaud when a growing potential tyrant does what you do NOT want
As for your reply:
If a potential tyrant did something like relinquishing power, then by definition they wouldn’t be growing.
Okay – but a “potential tyrant” could be growing at some point and then, after relinquishing (some) power, either no longer growing, or growing slower, or even shrinking. I don’t understand why a ‘by definition’ argument clarifies this.
But still – why even bother to posit a rule about ‘applauding’ the actions of a potential tyrant at all? What’s your theory about the efficacy of such a rule? What’s the point? And why qualify such a rule to only those occasions when the potential tyrant “does what you want”?
And why qualify such a rule to only those occasions when the potential tyrant “does what you want”?
Because nobody needs to be warned not to applaud a potential tyrant who does not do what they want.
The idea is derived both from Superintelligence main metaphor, where sparrows try to raise an owl to solve all their problems, representing AGI without care for alignment, and past human history. In order to solve a problem, one feeds a monster that (quickly) ends up becoming much worse than the initial problem. I remember reading that in conquering the Aztec empire, Cortés took advantage of the resentment that existed between local tribes and the central government ; so did Caesar when he took over the Gaules. In fiction, the novel Brown Morning describes a slippery slope towards tyranny where some fail to react early because they’re not concerned or have something to gain. The novel is very naive and simplistic, but short, universal and to the point.
Here I’m reminding that the political actor that OP notes for their efficiency, reaches such ‘efficiency’ through oppressive measures, lacks the solid legitimacy required to impose such extreme measures, and has an history of playing fast and loose with the tenets of democracy that predates this crisis. That’s not a move in isolation, and if you look at the big picture, it’s clear that ‘public health’ or ‘saving lives’ is not the endgame of these measures. Therefore, supporting those measures would be short-sighted.
I’m pretty skeptical that this analysis applies to the specific example you mentioned – or not particularly strongly anyways.
But I didn’t interpret your original comment as, or even notice the possibility of it, directly linking the ‘doing something you want’ with ‘seizing more power’. aphyer’s comment helpfully clarified that.
Depends on the amount of the fine. But even if it was reasonable, the government of my country would need to produce at least 2 other components to make a credible good will attempt at saving lives:
They should be increasing the number of hospital beds available and hire health professionnals, instead of closing beds as they’ve been doing throughout the pandemic
They should set boundaries to the duration of the fine, promise not to raise it or lenghten it, and have a credible way of showing they’ll keep that promise, or, barring that, a track record of keeping their word. Instead, they have emergency powers, can pass decrees without parliament approval, and have consistently broken their words arguing that “the circumstances have changed”
I guess what I like about fines is that they have a well defined endpoint. They end when people have either complied with whatever they need to comply with OR they’ve paid the fine.
As for hospital beds—absolutely. In fact another reason I lean toward fines is that the money can be earmarked for very specific things, like treatment.
I’m not sold on the idea of everybody needing a booster shot forever, if that’s one of your concerns.
Meh – there seems to me to be a lot of ambiguity about what ‘applauding’ is, or what purposes it serves (or is intended to serve), but still, I’m confused why you wrote:
instead of just:
Certainly the rule isn’t:
As for your reply:
Okay – but a “potential tyrant” could be growing at some point and then, after relinquishing (some) power, either no longer growing, or growing slower, or even shrinking. I don’t understand why a ‘by definition’ argument clarifies this.
But still – why even bother to posit a rule about ‘applauding’ the actions of a potential tyrant at all? What’s your theory about the efficacy of such a rule? What’s the point? And why qualify such a rule to only those occasions when the potential tyrant “does what you want”?
Because nobody needs to be warned not to applaud a potential tyrant who does not do what they want.
The idea is derived both from Superintelligence main metaphor, where sparrows try to raise an owl to solve all their problems, representing AGI without care for alignment, and past human history. In order to solve a problem, one feeds a monster that (quickly) ends up becoming much worse than the initial problem. I remember reading that in conquering the Aztec empire, Cortés took advantage of the resentment that existed between local tribes and the central government ; so did Caesar when he took over the Gaules. In fiction, the novel Brown Morning describes a slippery slope towards tyranny where some fail to react early because they’re not concerned or have something to gain. The novel is very naive and simplistic, but short, universal and to the point.
Here I’m reminding that the political actor that OP notes for their efficiency, reaches such ‘efficiency’ through oppressive measures, lacks the solid legitimacy required to impose such extreme measures, and has an history of playing fast and loose with the tenets of democracy that predates this crisis. That’s not a move in isolation, and if you look at the big picture, it’s clear that ‘public health’ or ‘saving lives’ is not the endgame of these measures. Therefore, supporting those measures would be short-sighted.
I’m pretty skeptical that this analysis applies to the specific example you mentioned – or not particularly strongly anyways.
But I didn’t interpret your original comment as, or even notice the possibility of it, directly linking the ‘doing something you want’ with ‘seizing more power’. aphyer’s comment helpfully clarified that.
Would you be more comfortable with a more traditional measure like imposing a hefty fine on people who don’t get vaccinated?
Depends on the amount of the fine. But even if it was reasonable, the government of my country would need to produce at least 2 other components to make a credible good will attempt at saving lives:
They should be increasing the number of hospital beds available and hire health professionnals, instead of closing beds as they’ve been doing throughout the pandemic
They should set boundaries to the duration of the fine, promise not to raise it or lenghten it, and have a credible way of showing they’ll keep that promise, or, barring that, a track record of keeping their word. Instead, they have emergency powers, can pass decrees without parliament approval, and have consistently broken their words arguing that “the circumstances have changed”
I guess what I like about fines is that they have a well defined endpoint. They end when people have either complied with whatever they need to comply with OR they’ve paid the fine.
As for hospital beds—absolutely. In fact another reason I lean toward fines is that the money can be earmarked for very specific things, like treatment.
I’m not sold on the idea of everybody needing a booster shot forever, if that’s one of your concerns.
Ok, it seems we have something to work with, then. Amounts and validity periods can be negotiated.