Regardless, I think there’s a further distinction there that ArisC isn’t making. Actual systems of social enforcement don’t generally consist of enforcing all and only the tenets of a particular moral theory. No one (so far as I know) thinks it’s a fundamental moral principle that we should drive on the left or, as it may be, the right side of the road, or that we should pay 25% income tax rather than 20% or 30%, but this sort of thing is enforced, often quite vigorously. Presumably there’s some sort of moral system underlying the choice of things to enforce (though, given how laws are actually made, it will be a weird mishmash of the moral systems and non-moral preferences and pecuniary interests and so forth of the law-makers, and it certainly won’t satisfy any nice neat meta-level axioms except by good luck), but the things enforced will not be the same as the moral values leading to their selection.
Well, Since it’s not part of everyone’s moral theory, clearly we can’t impinge on people’s liberty to drive in their preferred lane.
Ok, sorry—please ignore that.
I suspect this is a good place for another level—how does your moral theory prescribe enforcement of morally-irrelevant actions? And does your meta-theory prefer theories with more enforcement of cohesion or more room for diversity?
Regardless, I think there’s a further distinction there that ArisC isn’t making. Actual systems of social enforcement don’t generally consist of enforcing all and only the tenets of a particular moral theory. No one (so far as I know) thinks it’s a fundamental moral principle that we should drive on the left or, as it may be, the right side of the road, or that we should pay 25% income tax rather than 20% or 30%, but this sort of thing is enforced, often quite vigorously. Presumably there’s some sort of moral system underlying the choice of things to enforce (though, given how laws are actually made, it will be a weird mishmash of the moral systems and non-moral preferences and pecuniary interests and so forth of the law-makers, and it certainly won’t satisfy any nice neat meta-level axioms except by good luck), but the things enforced will not be the same as the moral values leading to their selection.
Well, Since it’s not part of everyone’s moral theory, clearly we can’t impinge on people’s liberty to drive in their preferred lane.
Ok, sorry—please ignore that.
I suspect this is a good place for another level—how does your moral theory prescribe enforcement of morally-irrelevant actions? And does your meta-theory prefer theories with more enforcement of cohesion or more room for diversity?