This is to some extent a post I wanted to see, since I have been saying for ages that metaethics should be approached with an explicit set of criteria for what an ethical theory is, what it should do, and what makes it right, as opposed to glancing at something, and noticing a signal of approval from system I.
c) If the principles of the moral theory are taken to their logical conclusion, they must not lead to a society that the theory’s proponents themselves would consider dystopian.
That’s rather weak. Why not have a criterion that selects for good outcomes, rather than avoiding bad outcomes?
One objection might be that the revised c) begs the question in favour of consequentialism....but the original c) already had a toehold in consequentialism.
What I mean by this is that the principles must be derived logically from facts on which everyone agrees.
You are going to need to do something about the is-ought divide. On the other hand, your example is liberty, which is clearly a value.
This is to some extent a post I wanted to see, since I have been saying for ages that metaethics should be approached with an explicit set of criteria for what an ethical theory is, what it should do, and what makes it right, as opposed to glancing at something, and noticing a signal of approval from system I.
That’s rather weak. Why not have a criterion that selects for good outcomes, rather than avoiding bad outcomes?
One objection might be that the revised c) begs the question in favour of consequentialism....but the original c) already had a toehold in consequentialism.
You are going to need to do something about the is-ought divide. On the other hand, your example is liberty, which is clearly a value.