Thinking about this article a bit more, you’re missing a very important point. Namely, a “Schelling fence” is often of supreme importance even when there aren’t multiple interest groups involved. (Nor even time- or value-inconsistent versions of the same party.)
This is because in most cases of conflict, pre-commitments are difficult to communicate. If you’re maintaining some line of defence against an opponent and you’re credibly pre-committed to defend even if the cost of defence is higher than the value of the prize fought over, you’re safe against a rational opponent who perceives this pre-commitment correctly. However, if you have no such pre-commitment, the opponent has the incentive to mount an overwhelming attack even if the cost of the attack is higher than the prize—since in that case you’ll find it rational to retreat and avoid fighting.
The trouble is, communicating pre-commitment credibly is difficult, since it’s always in your interest to assert pre-commitment to defend as credibly as possible, but secretly plan to withdraw if your bluff gets called. So this is where the Schelling points come into play: a conspicuous Schelling point helps create a meeting of minds about pre-commitments between the conflicting parties. Your commitment to defend at that line is credible because by failing to defend it, you lose not only that particular prize, but also everything up to the next strong Schelling point, which may even be nonexistent. (And is certainly harder to use effectively once you have a reputation as a pushover who gives up on valuable Schelling points.)
So, in case of Holocaust denial laws, there might be rational reason to oppose them even if a single Holocaust denier didn’t exist. The principle that the government can’t legislate official truth is a very clear Schelling point. The same principle modified by an exemption for those cases where the truth is evident and its denial offensive, much less so. Who gets to decide what’s evident and what’s offensive anyway? So once you’ve conceded that the government can prohibit you to say that that the Holocaust didn’t happen, or that 2+2=5, there isn’t any clear Schelling point where you’d draw the line and pre-commit to fight the prohibition.
Or is there? Currently, in the Western world outside the U.S., there are several fairly strong Schelling points based on a general perception about a few extremely low-status kinds of people—basically, speech restrictions are considered OK if and only if they specifically target these sorts of people. In most places, these groups include neo-Nazis (and right-wing extremists in general) and certain kinds of sexual deviants, and Holocaust denial prohibition is considered OK because it specifically targets the former. However, there is definitely an ongoing slippery-slope effect here—in many countries, the class of speech restrictions that is vaguely associated with the “right-wing extremist” exception is increasingly used to enforce ideological conformity on a number of issues where dissent from the respectable opinion should not merit that title by any reasonable definition. (And where, arguably, honest pursuit of truth will lead one to disagree with the respectable opinion.)
Thinking about this article a bit more, you’re missing a very important point. Namely, a “Schelling fence” is often of supreme importance even when there aren’t multiple interest groups involved. (Nor even time- or value-inconsistent versions of the same party.)
This is because in most cases of conflict, pre-commitments are difficult to communicate. If you’re maintaining some line of defence against an opponent and you’re credibly pre-committed to defend even if the cost of defence is higher than the value of the prize fought over, you’re safe against a rational opponent who perceives this pre-commitment correctly. However, if you have no such pre-commitment, the opponent has the incentive to mount an overwhelming attack even if the cost of the attack is higher than the prize—since in that case you’ll find it rational to retreat and avoid fighting.
The trouble is, communicating pre-commitment credibly is difficult, since it’s always in your interest to assert pre-commitment to defend as credibly as possible, but secretly plan to withdraw if your bluff gets called. So this is where the Schelling points come into play: a conspicuous Schelling point helps create a meeting of minds about pre-commitments between the conflicting parties. Your commitment to defend at that line is credible because by failing to defend it, you lose not only that particular prize, but also everything up to the next strong Schelling point, which may even be nonexistent. (And is certainly harder to use effectively once you have a reputation as a pushover who gives up on valuable Schelling points.)
So, in case of Holocaust denial laws, there might be rational reason to oppose them even if a single Holocaust denier didn’t exist. The principle that the government can’t legislate official truth is a very clear Schelling point. The same principle modified by an exemption for those cases where the truth is evident and its denial offensive, much less so. Who gets to decide what’s evident and what’s offensive anyway? So once you’ve conceded that the government can prohibit you to say that that the Holocaust didn’t happen, or that 2+2=5, there isn’t any clear Schelling point where you’d draw the line and pre-commit to fight the prohibition.
Or is there? Currently, in the Western world outside the U.S., there are several fairly strong Schelling points based on a general perception about a few extremely low-status kinds of people—basically, speech restrictions are considered OK if and only if they specifically target these sorts of people. In most places, these groups include neo-Nazis (and right-wing extremists in general) and certain kinds of sexual deviants, and Holocaust denial prohibition is considered OK because it specifically targets the former. However, there is definitely an ongoing slippery-slope effect here—in many countries, the class of speech restrictions that is vaguely associated with the “right-wing extremist” exception is increasingly used to enforce ideological conformity on a number of issues where dissent from the respectable opinion should not merit that title by any reasonable definition. (And where, arguably, honest pursuit of truth will lead one to disagree with the respectable opinion.)
I know that discussing politics is Dangerous, but this is too tantalizing to ignore. Do you have any examples?
Try this thread.