They do. The advantage of such confusing patterns is that they’re memorable and rhetorically interesting, but they receive no points for clarity.
So you actually did mean that if you undergo a meta-level value calculation, you will decide that the value of information from doing an object-level moral calculation is sometimes negative?
The advantage of such confusing patterns is that they’re memorable and rhetorically interesting, but they receive no points for clarity.
If the writer is doing his job, the different senses of the term should be clear in context, and the construction serves to reinforce that a distinction is being made between two senses of a term. The cognitive dissonance inherent in the seeming contradiction helps make it memorable so that it can act as a touchstone to the in context meaning.
That’s if the writer is doing his job. Often, the writer is merely mesmerized by his own language, and is wallowing in the “mystery of the paradox”.
Of course. Complex arguments tend to call for as much clarity as possible, though, so i’d advocate generally avoiding these constructions in venues like LessWrong.
I started as a poet, so I hope I’ll be forgiven my occasional forays into rhetorically interesting constructions, as I am prone to them.
I’d say that the construction is somewhat weaker; if you undergo a meta-level value calculation, you -may- decide that the value of information from doing an object-level moral calculation is sometimes negative, including the cost of the calculation in the value of the information. (There’s a joke in there somewhere about the infinite cost I calculated in my meta-meta-level value calculation for collecting the information to prove the meta-level calculation for all cases...)
They have their uses, but the word “rational” can be a bit sensitive around here. If you’ve done a value of information calculation and decided the moral calculation isn’t worth your time, then obviously doing that moral calculation can’t be considered “rational.” Though it could be a way to attempt to make a “rational” choice on a moral problem. This meta-level stuff can be tricky!
That’s what I meant to say, actually; I think we agree on what the construction means now,
They do. The advantage of such confusing patterns is that they’re memorable and rhetorically interesting, but they receive no points for clarity.
So you actually did mean that if you undergo a meta-level value calculation, you will decide that the value of information from doing an object-level moral calculation is sometimes negative?
If the writer is doing his job, the different senses of the term should be clear in context, and the construction serves to reinforce that a distinction is being made between two senses of a term. The cognitive dissonance inherent in the seeming contradiction helps make it memorable so that it can act as a touchstone to the in context meaning.
That’s if the writer is doing his job. Often, the writer is merely mesmerized by his own language, and is wallowing in the “mystery of the paradox”.
Of course. Complex arguments tend to call for as much clarity as possible, though, so i’d advocate generally avoiding these constructions in venues like LessWrong.
I started as a poet, so I hope I’ll be forgiven my occasional forays into rhetorically interesting constructions, as I am prone to them.
I’d say that the construction is somewhat weaker; if you undergo a meta-level value calculation, you -may- decide that the value of information from doing an object-level moral calculation is sometimes negative, including the cost of the calculation in the value of the information. (There’s a joke in there somewhere about the infinite cost I calculated in my meta-meta-level value calculation for collecting the information to prove the meta-level calculation for all cases...)
They have their uses, but the word “rational” can be a bit sensitive around here. If you’ve done a value of information calculation and decided the moral calculation isn’t worth your time, then obviously doing that moral calculation can’t be considered “rational.” Though it could be a way to attempt to make a “rational” choice on a moral problem. This meta-level stuff can be tricky!
That’s what I meant to say, actually; I think we agree on what the construction means now,
I’ll add one thing, on consideration: Doing that calculation may be irrational, but that’s not to say the calculation itself is irrational.