The vNM axioms constrain the shape of an agent’s preferences, they say nothing about how to make decisions
Suppose your decision in a particular situation comes down to choosing between some number of lotteries (with specific estimated probabilities over their outcomes) and there’s no complexity/nuance/tricks on top of that. In that case, vNM says that you should choose the one with the highest expected utility as this is the one you prefer the most.
At least assuming that choice is the right operationalization of preferences but if it isn’t, then the Dutch book / money-pump arguments don’t follow.
ETA: I guess I could just say:
What are your preferences if not your idealized evaluations of decision-worthiness of options (modulo “being a corrupted piece of software running on corrupted hardware”)?
Suppose your decision in a particular situation comes down to choosing between some number of lotteries (with specific estimated probabilities over their outcomes) and there’s no complexity/nuance/tricks on top of that. In that case, vNM says that you should choose the one with the highest expected utility as this is the one you prefer the most.
At least assuming that choice is the right operationalization of preferences but if it isn’t, then the Dutch book / money-pump arguments don’t follow.
ETA: I guess I could just say: