However, reducing a philosophical claim to an empirical one never quite captures it.
There are clearly some examples where there can be interesting things to say that aren’t really empirical, e.g. decision theory, mystery of subjective experience. But I think that this isn’t one of them.
Suffice it to say I can’t think of anything that makes the debate between weak realism and antirealism at all interesting or worthy of attention. Certainly, Friendly AI theorists ought not care about the difference, because the empirical claims about an AI system will do are identical. Once the illusions and fallacies surrounding rationalist moral psychology has been debunked, proponents of other AI motivation methods than FAI also ought not to care about the weak realism vs. anti-realism pseudo-question
There are clearly some examples where there can be interesting things to say that aren’t really empirical, e.g. decision theory, mystery of subjective experience. But I think that this isn’t one of them.
Suffice it to say I can’t think of anything that makes the debate between weak realism and antirealism at all interesting or worthy of attention. Certainly, Friendly AI theorists ought not care about the difference, because the empirical claims about an AI system will do are identical. Once the illusions and fallacies surrounding rationalist moral psychology has been debunked, proponents of other AI motivation methods than FAI also ought not to care about the weak realism vs. anti-realism pseudo-question