In metaethics, there are typically very good arguments against all known views, and only relatively weak arguments for each of them. For anything in philosophy, a good first stop is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Here are some articles on the topic at SEP:
Toby, I read through those SEP articles but couldn’t find the good arguments against anti-realism that you mentioned. In contrast, the article on deontology laid out the arguments for and against it very clearly.
Can you please point us more specifically to the arguments that you find persuasive? Maybe just give us some page numbers in the book that you referenced? Most of us don’t really have the time to read something like that cover to cover in search of a few nuggets of information.
Thank you for doing that, and may I second this. I started reading those articles, then after a bit started scanning for the anti-realism articles, and worried after not finding them that I’d not read carefully enough, so I’m glad to have your report on this.
I really am curious to read these arguments, so I hope someone can point us to them.
I managed to find a draft of a book chapter titled In Defence of Moral Realism. I’m still wondering what Toby thinks the best arguments are, but alas he doesn’t seem to be following this discussion anymore.
Thanks! Again, didn’t get much from a quick skim, let me know if you find any real meat in there.
The thing that really got my attention wasn’t the assertion that there are some arguments in favour of realism, but that there are good arguments specifically against anti-realism.
I know I’ve spoken of “skimming” twice here. I promise, if Toby Ord were to say to me “this contains good arguments against anti-realism” I would read it carefully.
The thing that really got my attention wasn’t the assertion that there are some arguments in favour of realism, but that there are good arguments specifically against anti-realism.
But surely an argument against anti-realism is also an argument for realism? I’m interpreting Toby’s comment as saying that there are good arguments for realism in general, but not for any particular realist meta-ethical theory.
Again, didn’t get much from a quick skim, let me know if you find any real meat in there.
The author says in the conclusion, “I do not pretend to give any knock-down argument in this chapter for the thesis that objective moral facts or
reasons exist, independently of our thoughts and actions.” So I think it’s mostly a matter of how convincing one finds the argument that he does give.
It seems likely, given that the author is a specialist in and proponent of moral realism, that he would give the best arguments that he knew, so this paper seems like good evidence for what kind of arguments for realism is currently available.
It seems likely, given that the author is a specialist in and proponent of moral realism, that he would give the best arguments that he knew, so this paper seems like good evidence for what kind of arguments for realism is currently available.
Thanks! There were several points in your PhD thesis where I couldn’t work out how to square your position with moral anti-realism—I guess I know why now :-)
Basically, morality is a product of evolution—which can be expected to favour some moral values over other ones—just as it favours certain physical structures like eyes and legs.
Things like: “under most circumstances, don’t massacre your relatives or yourself” can be reasonably expected to be widespread values in the universe. The idea gives morality a foundation in the natural world.
It is useful that Tim summarizes his position in this context, voted up.
My position, developed with no background in philosophy or meta-ethics whatsoever and thus likely to be error-riddled or misguided, is that I consider it an unsolved problem within physical materialism (specifically, within the context of moral anti-realism) how “meaning” (the meaning of life and/or the value of values) can be a coherent or possible concept.
Could you direct us to the best arguments for moral realism, or against anti-realism? Thanks!
In metaethics, there are typically very good arguments against all known views, and only relatively weak arguments for each of them. For anything in philosophy, a good first stop is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Here are some articles on the topic at SEP:
Moral Anti-Realism
Moral Realism
Metaethics
Moral Cognitivism vs Non-cognitivism
I think the best book to read on metaethics is:
An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics
Toby, I read through those SEP articles but couldn’t find the good arguments against anti-realism that you mentioned. In contrast, the article on deontology laid out the arguments for and against it very clearly.
Can you please point us more specifically to the arguments that you find persuasive? Maybe just give us some page numbers in the book that you referenced? Most of us don’t really have the time to read something like that cover to cover in search of a few nuggets of information.
Thank you for doing that, and may I second this. I started reading those articles, then after a bit started scanning for the anti-realism articles, and worried after not finding them that I’d not read carefully enough, so I’m glad to have your report on this.
I really am curious to read these arguments, so I hope someone can point us to them.
I managed to find a draft of a book chapter titled In Defence of Moral Realism. I’m still wondering what Toby thinks the best arguments are, but alas he doesn’t seem to be following this discussion anymore.
Thanks! Again, didn’t get much from a quick skim, let me know if you find any real meat in there.
The thing that really got my attention wasn’t the assertion that there are some arguments in favour of realism, but that there are good arguments specifically against anti-realism.
I know I’ve spoken of “skimming” twice here. I promise, if Toby Ord were to say to me “this contains good arguments against anti-realism” I would read it carefully.
But surely an argument against anti-realism is also an argument for realism? I’m interpreting Toby’s comment as saying that there are good arguments for realism in general, but not for any particular realist meta-ethical theory.
The author says in the conclusion, “I do not pretend to give any knock-down argument in this chapter for the thesis that objective moral facts or reasons exist, independently of our thoughts and actions.” So I think it’s mostly a matter of how convincing one finds the argument that he does give.
It seems likely, given that the author is a specialist in and proponent of moral realism, that he would give the best arguments that he knew, so this paper seems like good evidence for what kind of arguments for realism is currently available.
Will read carefully on that basis. Thanks.
Do you have a personal favourite argument against moral anti-realism in there you could point me to?
Thanks! There were several points in your PhD thesis where I couldn’t work out how to square your position with moral anti-realism—I guess I know why now :-)
My case was here:
http://lesswrong.com/lw/1m5/savulescu_genetically_enhance_humanity_or_face/1fuv
Basically, morality is a product of evolution—which can be expected to favour some moral values over other ones—just as it favours certain physical structures like eyes and legs.
Things like: “under most circumstances, don’t massacre your relatives or yourself” can be reasonably expected to be widespread values in the universe. The idea gives morality a foundation in the natural world.
It is useful that Tim summarizes his position in this context, voted up.
My position, developed with no background in philosophy or meta-ethics whatsoever and thus likely to be error-riddled or misguided, is that I consider it an unsolved problem within physical materialism (specifically, within the context of moral anti-realism) how “meaning” (the meaning of life and/or the value of values) can be a coherent or possible concept.
Leave humans out of it and try to think about meanings of signals among animals, with an evolutionary perspective.