In the game of chicken, an agent can do better by being the first to precommit to never swerve (say, by conspicuously tossing the steering wheel out of the window).
...unless the other agent has already precommitted to not being rational. (What is the advantage of this over just precommitting not to swerve? Precommitting to not be rational can happen even in advance of the game, as it’s mainly a property of the agent itself.)
(This is one way that you can rationally arrive at irrational agents.)
...unless the other agent has already precommitted to not being rational. (What is the advantage of this over just precommitting not to swerve? Precommitting to not be rational can happen even in advance of the game, as it’s mainly a property of the agent itself.)
(This is one way that you can rationally arrive at irrational agents.)