The facilitation hypothesis: “Phenomenally conscious perception of a stimulus facilitates, relative to unconscious perception, a cluster of cognitive abilities in relation to that stimulus.” This is compatible with most popular theories, and probably Yudkowsky’s position, depending on what we decide to include in the “cluster”. Summary here.
Another that’s worth mentioning, although I don’t know what to think of it anymore:
No-report paradigms, “which measure reflexive behaviors correlated with conscious states to provide a window on the phenomenal that is independent of access”. Some more discussion here, where it’s corrected to a “no-post-perceptual cognition paradigm”.
Some other less theory-heavy approaches to consciousness I find promising:
What do unconscious processes in humans tell us about sentience?, and then see Rethink Priorities’ table with evidence for various indicators for different species, with a column for unconscious processing in humans. (Disclaimer: I work at Rethink Priorities.)
The facilitation hypothesis: “Phenomenally conscious perception of a stimulus facilitates, relative to unconscious perception, a cluster of cognitive abilities in relation to that stimulus.” This is compatible with most popular theories, and probably Yudkowsky’s position, depending on what we decide to include in the “cluster”. Summary here.
Another that’s worth mentioning, although I don’t know what to think of it anymore:
No-report paradigms, “which measure reflexive behaviors correlated with conscious states to provide a window on the phenomenal that is independent of access”. Some more discussion here, where it’s corrected to a “no-post-perceptual cognition paradigm”.
For what it’s worth, I’m currently pretty skeptical that we can define consciousness in physical terms in a way that excludes panpsychism without drawing arbitrary lines. For example, how would you define a “self-model”, in terms of basic physical processes? And how accurate does it need to be to count?