According to Yudkowsky, is the self-model supposed to be fully recursive, so that the model feeds back into itself, rather than just having a finite stack of separate models each modelling the previous one (like here and here, although FWIW, I’d guess those authors are wrong that their theory rules out cephalopods)? If so, why does this matter, if we only ever recurse to bounded depth during a given conscious experience?
If not, then what does self-modelling actually accomplish? If modelling internal states is supposedly necessary for consciousness, how and why are we drawing distinctions between the internal and external? Why not the weaker claim that modelling states is necessary for consciousness? See some more discussion here, especially the sections “The extended mind” and “”Rock” objection.”
According to Yudkowsky, is the self-model supposed to be fully recursive, so that the model feeds back into itself, rather than just having a finite stack of separate models each modelling the previous one (like here and here, although FWIW, I’d guess those authors are wrong that their theory rules out cephalopods)? If so, why does this matter, if we only ever recurse to bounded depth during a given conscious experience?
If not, then what does self-modelling actually accomplish? If modelling internal states is supposedly necessary for consciousness, how and why are we drawing distinctions between the internal and external? Why not the weaker claim that modelling states is necessary for consciousness? See some more discussion here, especially the sections “The extended mind” and “”Rock” objection.”