Eliezer seems to believe that self-reflection or some other component of selfhood is necessary for the existence of the qualia of pain or suffering. A lot of people believe this simply because they use the word “consciousness” to refer to both (and 40 other things besides). I don’t know if Eliezer is making such a basic mistake, but I’m not sure why else he would believe that selfhood is necessary for suffering.
It is not my impression that Eliezer believes any such thing for pain, only (perhaps) for suffering. It’s important not to conflate these.
It seems clear to me, at least, that consciousness (in the “subjective, reflective self-awareness” sense) is necessary for suffering; so I don’t think that Eliezer is making any mistake at all (much less a basic mistake!).
Being a self, or thinking about yourself, is also just another perception — a product of your brain’s generative model of reality — like color or pain are
The word “just” is doing a heck of a lot of work here.
I think it’s equally likely that chickens experience selfless pain
Chickens perhaps have “selfless pain”, but to say that they experience anything at all is begging the question!
It is not my impression that Eliezer believes any such thing for pain, only (perhaps) for suffering. It’s important not to conflate these.
It seems clear to me, at least, that consciousness (in the “subjective, reflective self-awareness” sense) is necessary for suffering; so I don’t think that Eliezer is making any mistake at all (much less a basic mistake!).
The word “just” is doing a heck of a lot of work here.
Chickens perhaps have “selfless pain”, but to say that they experience anything at all is begging the question!