I think you can predict specific subjective states by observing that same computations result in same subjective states? I mean, in theory—do you mean that for a theory to be a reduction it must be practical to predict specific human’s qualia? By that standard we don’t have a physical reduction of billiard balls.
We do have a reductive explanation of billiard balls, in theory. If we don’t have a reductive explanation of billiard balls , we don’t have a reductive explanation of anything. Of course , the computations can be impractical, but that’s why Mary in Mary’s Room is a super scientist.
I think you can predict specific subjective states by observing that same computations result in same subjective states? I mean, in theory—do you mean that for a theory to be a reduction it must be practical to predict specific human’s qualia? By that standard we don’t have a physical reduction of billiard balls.
We do have a reductive explanation of billiard balls, in theory. If we don’t have a reductive explanation of billiard balls , we don’t have a reductive explanation of anything. Of course , the computations can be impractical, but that’s why Mary in Mary’s Room is a super scientist.