Being wrong is the best possible outcome of an argument, as it’s the one with the highest expected knowledge gain
No, that’s backwards. Learning that you are wrong is good if and only if you are wrong. But it’s only good because you were already wrong, which was bad—you were making bad decisions before. It’s like saying that it is better to win the lottery than to be born rich. Roughly speaking, it doesn’t matter when or where the money or knowledge comes from, only that you can use it.
So if you are surprised to find a $20 bill in your couch, your disappointment at having lost $20 some time in the past is equal to your pleasure at now having $20 more than you did a moment ago?
My current level of ignorance is a fact of life, I already know that there must be things that I’m wrong about. How is finding out something in particular that I am wrong about anything but a positive outcome?
So if you are surprised to find a $20 bill in your couch, your disappointment at having lost $20 some time in the past is equal to your pleasure at now having $20 more than you did a moment ago?
That depends rather a lot on my dopamine levels and thought patterns. I gain much more pleasure from finding cash than I am disappointed at losing it. Hang on… Excuse me. Going for a walk around my house with my wallet open.
So if you are surprised to find a $20 bill in your couch, your disappointment at having lost $20 some time in the past is equal to your pleasure at now having $20 more than you did a moment ago?
roughly, yes.
My current level of ignorance is a fact of life, I already know that there must be things that I’m wrong about. How is finding out something in particular that I am wrong about anything but a positive outcome?
If your mistakes are independent, then correcting one of them doesn’t (much) correct your estimate of how many more mistakes you have to correct. Say you have 21 beliefs with 95% confidence and an argument clarifies a random one of them. You still have 1 expected wrong belief. By independence, we might as well say it’s belief #1 that gets clarified. People who were wrong about it end up the same as people who were right about it. Yes, they gained more information, but they were really just unlucky to start with less information. This is exactly the lottery/inheritance model.
Yes, your ignorance is a fact, but it’s not a fact accessible to you. The argument decreases your estimate of your ignorance by the same amount, regardless of whether you win or lose. If you happen to know how ignorant you are, how many items you’re wrong about, then the situation is different, but that’s a lot less realistic than independence.
So if I understand the point you’re making: Losing an argument provides enough evidence of your prior ignorance to prevent any net gain in your expectation of your own overall knowledgeability, at least relative to winning the argument.
I don’t disagree, but I don’t know why I’d care to base an emotional response on this kind of evaluation. I’m not fretting over my absolute position on the axis of knowledge, I’m just hill climbing. It’s the first derivative that my decisions affect, not the initial constant.
It isn’t that winning the lottery is better than being born rich, it’s that winning the lottery is better than not winning the lottery. Even if you’re already rich, winning the lottery is good. Presumably you weren’t born right about everything, which means it’s more useful to lose arguments than win them. After all, if you never lose an argument, what’s more likely: that you are right about everything, that you’re the best arguer ever, or that you simply don’t argue things you’re wrong about?
After all, if you never lose an argument, what’s more likely: that you are right about everything, that you’re the best arguer ever, or that you simply don’t argue things you’re wrong about?
My first thought was b). What was the intended response?
No, that’s backwards. Learning that you are wrong is good if and only if you are wrong. But it’s only good because you were already wrong, which was bad—you were making bad decisions before. It’s like saying that it is better to win the lottery than to be born rich. Roughly speaking, it doesn’t matter when or where the money or knowledge comes from, only that you can use it.
So if you are surprised to find a $20 bill in your couch, your disappointment at having lost $20 some time in the past is equal to your pleasure at now having $20 more than you did a moment ago?
My current level of ignorance is a fact of life, I already know that there must be things that I’m wrong about. How is finding out something in particular that I am wrong about anything but a positive outcome?
That depends rather a lot on my dopamine levels and thought patterns. I gain much more pleasure from finding cash than I am disappointed at losing it. Hang on… Excuse me. Going for a walk around my house with my wallet open.
Careful… diminishing returns still apply ;)
roughly, yes.
If your mistakes are independent, then correcting one of them doesn’t (much) correct your estimate of how many more mistakes you have to correct. Say you have 21 beliefs with 95% confidence and an argument clarifies a random one of them. You still have 1 expected wrong belief. By independence, we might as well say it’s belief #1 that gets clarified. People who were wrong about it end up the same as people who were right about it. Yes, they gained more information, but they were really just unlucky to start with less information. This is exactly the lottery/inheritance model.
Yes, your ignorance is a fact, but it’s not a fact accessible to you. The argument decreases your estimate of your ignorance by the same amount, regardless of whether you win or lose. If you happen to know how ignorant you are, how many items you’re wrong about, then the situation is different, but that’s a lot less realistic than independence.
So if I understand the point you’re making: Losing an argument provides enough evidence of your prior ignorance to prevent any net gain in your expectation of your own overall knowledgeability, at least relative to winning the argument.
I don’t disagree, but I don’t know why I’d care to base an emotional response on this kind of evaluation. I’m not fretting over my absolute position on the axis of knowledge, I’m just hill climbing. It’s the first derivative that my decisions affect, not the initial constant.
It isn’t that winning the lottery is better than being born rich, it’s that winning the lottery is better than not winning the lottery. Even if you’re already rich, winning the lottery is good. Presumably you weren’t born right about everything, which means it’s more useful to lose arguments than win them. After all, if you never lose an argument, what’s more likely: that you are right about everything, that you’re the best arguer ever, or that you simply don’t argue things you’re wrong about?
My first thought was b). What was the intended response?
Or that you are right about everything that you believe in strongly enough to argue about.
In other words, avoid believing strongly in the absence of evidence. And don’t argue where you don’t have the facts on your side.
Presumably, not (a). In both other cases you’ve managed to not notice you’re wrong.