I’m not worried about the range of /all/ timelines, only those timelines which proceed into the future from this moment. (And now, the ones from this moment. Etc.)
Let’s say that I decide to use a quantum randomizer to pick my first move in a game of Tic-Tac-Toe, and then play to win, or at least draw; and then I do just that. While it may be a fact that in /some/ timelines I’ll change my mind and not play to win, in the /majority/ of timelines which proceed from that spot, I will continue to play to win.
Hm… how about a different approach. You seem to be arguing that if I’m about to roll some dice, then all possible rolls are going to happen. I’m not arguing against that. What I’m arguing is that some rolls are more likely than others—the classic bell curve—and that by choosing to roll, say, 3d8 instead of 3d6, it’s possible to manipulate the shape of that bell curve, so that a the timelines are divvied up into different proportions than otherwise. Or maybe I use loaded dice, or scribble extra pips on, or just plan old fake-roll a die and set it to a certain number, or otherwise adjust the odds in my favor. Maybe I’ll even change the probability distribution from a simple bell curve to two distinct bell curves, where the maximum probability is rolling a 3 or 18, with next-to-no probability of rolling anything in between. Sure, there will be a /small portion/ of timelines where I don’t cheat, but in the /greater portion/ of timelines where I /do/ cheat, the /sub portion/ where I get the results I desire will be high—much higher than would be expected by simply assuming the standard distribution.
(If anyone else reading this wants to jump in, and either explain to me how I’m getting Lumifer’s idea wrong, or can do a better job explaining the idea I’m trying to get across, feel free...)
by choosing to roll, say, 3d8 instead of 3d6, it’s possible to manipulate the shape of that bell curve
It’s turtles all the way down.
This-you chose to roll 3d8 and other-you chose to roll 3d6 and yet more of other-yous chose to roll 1d10, 7d36, etc. etc. Yes, you manipulated the bell curve but in other timelines it also got manipulated, albeit in a different way. When you step in one direction, yes, the timelines spreading out from that step are biased in that direction. But the step itself, when you made it another-you also made a step, in a different direction, and biased another bunch of timelines in that different direction.
The set of all possible futures is the set of all possible futures—you cannot change it.
I think I’ve run out of different ways to try to explain what I’m trying to get across; so we seem to have hit the door-wall debate limit. (“This is a door.” “Yes, but /this/ is a wall.” “Yes, but /this/...”)
If I were to try to explain our difference to an outsider, I might describe your position as being that as there are an infinite number of timelines, any sub-portion of them also contains an infinite number of timelines, and thus any given infinity is equally as important as any other, so there’s no reason to prefer any one bundle of timelines over another. Would you say that that’s valid? If not, could you explain where I’m going wrong? And if so, would you be willing to try to describe the idea I’ve been trying to explain?
I’m not worried about the range of /all/ timelines, only those timelines which proceed into the future from this moment. (And now, the ones from this moment. Etc.)
Let’s say that I decide to use a quantum randomizer to pick my first move in a game of Tic-Tac-Toe, and then play to win, or at least draw; and then I do just that. While it may be a fact that in /some/ timelines I’ll change my mind and not play to win, in the /majority/ of timelines which proceed from that spot, I will continue to play to win.
Hm… how about a different approach. You seem to be arguing that if I’m about to roll some dice, then all possible rolls are going to happen. I’m not arguing against that. What I’m arguing is that some rolls are more likely than others—the classic bell curve—and that by choosing to roll, say, 3d8 instead of 3d6, it’s possible to manipulate the shape of that bell curve, so that a the timelines are divvied up into different proportions than otherwise. Or maybe I use loaded dice, or scribble extra pips on, or just plan old fake-roll a die and set it to a certain number, or otherwise adjust the odds in my favor. Maybe I’ll even change the probability distribution from a simple bell curve to two distinct bell curves, where the maximum probability is rolling a 3 or 18, with next-to-no probability of rolling anything in between. Sure, there will be a /small portion/ of timelines where I don’t cheat, but in the /greater portion/ of timelines where I /do/ cheat, the /sub portion/ where I get the results I desire will be high—much higher than would be expected by simply assuming the standard distribution.
(If anyone else reading this wants to jump in, and either explain to me how I’m getting Lumifer’s idea wrong, or can do a better job explaining the idea I’m trying to get across, feel free...)
It’s turtles all the way down.
This-you chose to roll 3d8 and other-you chose to roll 3d6 and yet more of other-yous chose to roll 1d10, 7d36, etc. etc. Yes, you manipulated the bell curve but in other timelines it also got manipulated, albeit in a different way. When you step in one direction, yes, the timelines spreading out from that step are biased in that direction. But the step itself, when you made it another-you also made a step, in a different direction, and biased another bunch of timelines in that different direction.
The set of all possible futures is the set of all possible futures—you cannot change it.
I think I’ve run out of different ways to try to explain what I’m trying to get across; so we seem to have hit the door-wall debate limit. (“This is a door.” “Yes, but /this/ is a wall.” “Yes, but /this/...”)
If I were to try to explain our difference to an outsider, I might describe your position as being that as there are an infinite number of timelines, any sub-portion of them also contains an infinite number of timelines, and thus any given infinity is equally as important as any other, so there’s no reason to prefer any one bundle of timelines over another. Would you say that that’s valid? If not, could you explain where I’m going wrong? And if so, would you be willing to try to describe the idea I’ve been trying to explain?