A good rule of thumb: If it looks like someone is making an obviously stupid mistake, you’re probably misunderstanding them. It’s a benefit of the principle of charity.
I don’t understand your point. Are you saying that you knew all along that there wasn’t contradiction; that you were simply observing that there might appear to be a contradiction to some people?
Are you saying that you knew all along that there wasn’t contradiction
Yes
Are you saying that … you were simply observing that there might appear to be a contradiction to some people?
No, I was initially pointing to the tension between the two statements, and underscoring that by noting the seeming implication. You did not acknowledge the tension when those statements were juxtaposed by loqi, so I was trying to make it clear that they are in apparent conflict. Given “S will lose his job if he could not X” and “S often makes mistakes when trying to X”, it does not deductively follow that “S lost his job”, but it’s the result to bet on. Learning in that context that S did not lose his job, one should perform a Bayesian update to decrease the probability of the premises.
No, I was initially pointing to the tension between the two statements
Ok, I see your point now. But using the same principle of charity, it’s easy enough to read my statements so that they are not in contradiction (or tension) with eachother.
Indeed, that’s why I used the word “seems”.
A good rule of thumb: If it looks like someone is making an obviously stupid mistake, you’re probably misunderstanding them. It’s a benefit of the principle of charity.
I don’t understand your point. Are you saying that you knew all along that there wasn’t contradiction; that you were simply observing that there might appear to be a contradiction to some people?
Yes
No, I was initially pointing to the tension between the two statements, and underscoring that by noting the seeming implication. You did not acknowledge the tension when those statements were juxtaposed by loqi, so I was trying to make it clear that they are in apparent conflict. Given “S will lose his job if he could not X” and “S often makes mistakes when trying to X”, it does not deductively follow that “S lost his job”, but it’s the result to bet on. Learning in that context that S did not lose his job, one should perform a Bayesian update to decrease the probability of the premises.
Ok, I see your point now. But using the same principle of charity, it’s easy enough to read my statements so that they are not in contradiction (or tension) with eachother.