If the intuition that look-up is not sufficient computation for consciousness is correct, then a flaw in the Turing Test is exposed. If a complex Computation Programme could pass
the TT, then a GLUT version must be able to as well.
The values of the GLUT have to be populated somehow, which means matching an instance of the associated computation against an identical stimulus by some means at some point in the past. Intuitively it seems likely that a GLUT is too simple to instantiate consciousness on its own, but it seems to be better viewed as one component of a larger system that must in practice include a conscious agent, albeit one temporally and spatially removed from the thought experiment’s present.
Isn’t this basically a restatement of the Chinese Room?
If the intuition that look-up is not sufficient computation for consciousness is correct, then a flaw in the Turing Test is exposed. If a complex Computation Programme could pass the TT, then a GLUT version must be able to as well.
Sure, I agree that with a sufficiently constrained questioner, the Turing Test is pretty much useless.
The values of the GLUT have to be populated somehow, which means matching an instance of the associated computation against an identical stimulus by some means at some point in the past. Intuitively it seems likely that a GLUT is too simple to instantiate consciousness on its own, but it seems to be better viewed as one component of a larger system that must in practice include a conscious agent, albeit one temporally and spatially removed from the thought experiment’s present.
Isn’t this basically a restatement of the Chinese Room?