To say that a machine computed 2+2 means that it had taken data representing “2” and “2″ and performed an operation which, based on the same interpretation that establishes the isomorphism, is equivalent to addition of an arbitrary pair of numbers.
“computing red” makes as much sense as “computing 2″, and for roughly the same reasons. “Red” is a symbol representing either emissive or reflective color.
Algorithm, at a guess, but the distinction is moot—the output of the algorithm will include references to consciousness in such detail that I find it implausible that any other algorithm implementing the same function will fail to share the relevant features.
I have no idea what this question means.
If you’re talking about physics, the question makes no sense—a ToE in physics is no more likely to explain consciousness than it is to explain economics.
Consciousness appears to be a self-reflective behavior to me. At a minimum, any conscious algorithm would have to reflect this.
Tentatively, my gut reactions are:
(c)
Any Turing, I expect.
To say that a machine computed 2+2 means that it had taken data representing “2” and “2″ and performed an operation which, based on the same interpretation that establishes the isomorphism, is equivalent to addition of an arbitrary pair of numbers.
“computing red” makes as much sense as “computing 2″, and for roughly the same reasons. “Red” is a symbol representing either emissive or reflective color.
Algorithm, at a guess, but the distinction is moot—the output of the algorithm will include references to consciousness in such detail that I find it implausible that any other algorithm implementing the same function will fail to share the relevant features.
I have no idea what this question means.
If you’re talking about physics, the question makes no sense—a ToE in physics is no more likely to explain consciousness than it is to explain economics.
Consciousness appears to be a self-reflective behavior to me. At a minimum, any conscious algorithm would have to reflect this.
(4) It is easy to see how “red” could be computed in that sense. The OP clearly thinks it is difficult, so presumably had another sense in mind.
If so, further elaboration would be helpful.
Well, the existence of qualia is a classic objection to computationalism and physicalism, and red is the classic quale.
I was talking about the experiential phenomenon of seeing redness.