(2) Humans can manually compute any algorithm that a TM compute (this is just
the Church Turing conjecture in reverse), so a human has to be at least a UTM.
The significant part of the computationalist claim is that humans are at most
a UTM.
(4) No.
(5) If intermediate steps matter, the Turing Test is invalidate, since a Giant
Lookup table could produce the same results with trivial intermediate steps.
However, computationalists do not have to subscribe to the TT.
(7) An “And gate” looks like a piece of hardware, but it is really anything that
computes a certain abstract function. Computationalism requires that a mind
is essentially a class of programmes. Computationalism probably does
not require a very fine grained description of the Consciousness Programme,
since that would make it hard to explain how numerous different people with
different brains and life expreiences could all be conscious. (Computationalism
has to retrodict human consciousness as well as predict AI). That being the case,
computationalism can stop short of a description of computation that does not go all
the way down to primitive elements. (Computation is of course not essentially
tied to the binary system. You could have a decimal UTM).
(6) Either qualia don’t exist at all, even as mere appearances, or they have to be mentioned. I go for the latter. (A complete theory of optics has to be able to explain mirages!)
(8) I don’t think any computaitonalist thinks all computations are conscious. Consciousness, for computationalists, cannot be any programme, or just one programme, but must be a set of programmes each embedding a UTM.
(2) Humans can manually compute any algorithm that a TM compute (this is just the Church Turing conjecture in reverse), so a human has to be at least a UTM. The significant part of the computationalist claim is that humans are at most a UTM.
(4) No.
(5) If intermediate steps matter, the Turing Test is invalidate, since a Giant Lookup table could produce the same results with trivial intermediate steps. However, computationalists do not have to subscribe to the TT.
(7) An “And gate” looks like a piece of hardware, but it is really anything that computes a certain abstract function. Computationalism requires that a mind is essentially a class of programmes. Computationalism probably does not require a very fine grained description of the Consciousness Programme, since that would make it hard to explain how numerous different people with different brains and life expreiences could all be conscious. (Computationalism has to retrodict human consciousness as well as predict AI). That being the case, computationalism can stop short of a description of computation that does not go all the way down to primitive elements. (Computation is of course not essentially tied to the binary system. You could have a decimal UTM).
(6) Either qualia don’t exist at all, even as mere appearances, or they have to be mentioned. I go for the latter. (A complete theory of optics has to be able to explain mirages!)
(8) I don’t think any computaitonalist thinks all computations are conscious. Consciousness, for computationalists, cannot be any programme, or just one programme, but must be a set of programmes each embedding a UTM.