I would describe myself as a computationalist by default, in that I can’t come up with an ironclad argument against it. So, here are my stabs:
1) I’m not sure what you mean by an abstract machine (and please excuse me if that’s a formal term). Is that a potential or theoretical machine? That’s how I’m reading it. If that’s the case, I would say that CIRJC means both a and b. It’s a computation of an extremely sophisticated algorithm, the way 2 + 2 = 4 is the computation of a “simple” one (that still needs something really big like math to execute).
2) I don’t know if there needs to be a particular class of models; do you mean we know in advance what the particular human consciousness model is? I’d probably say we’d need several models operating in parallel, and that set would be the “human consciousness model”.
3) To me, that just means that a simple state machine took in an input, executed some steps, and provided an output on a screen. There was some change of register positions via electricity.
4) Computing red: here’s where qualia is going to make things messy. In a video game, I don’t have any problem imagine someone issuing a command to a Sim to “move the red box” and the Sim would do so. That’s all computation (I don’t think there’s “really” a Sim or a red box for that matter living in my TV set), but the video game executed what I was picturing in my head via internal qualia. So it seems like there would be an approximation of “computing” red.
5) I don’t have any problem saying the algorithm would be very important. I can put this in completely human terms. A psychopath can perfectly imitate emotions, and enact the exact same behavioral output as someone else in similar circumstances. The internal algorithm, if you will, is extremely different however.
6) I would say this is an emphatic yes. Neurons, for instance, serve as some sort of gate analog.
7) I think it would mention qualia, in as much as people would ask about it (so there would at least be enough of an explanation to explain it away, so to speak).
8) I don’t think computations are conscious in and of themselves. If I’m doing math in notebook, I don’t think the equations are conscious. I don’t think the circuitry of a calculator or a computer are conscious. That said, I don’t think individual cells of my brain are conscious, and if you were to remove portion of a person’s brain (surgery for cancer, for example) that those portions remain conscious, or that person is less conscious by the percentage of tissue removed. Consciousness, to me, may be algorithmically based, but is still the awareness of self, history, etc. that makes humans human. Saying CIRJC doesn’t remove the complexity of the calculation.
I haven’t read that other thread; can I ask what your opinions are? Briefly of course, and while I can’t speak for everyone else, I promise to read them as thumbnails and not absolute statements to be used against you. You could point to writers (Searle? Penrose?) if you like.
I haven’t read that other thread; can I ask what your opinions are? Briefly of course, and while I can’t speak for everyone else, I promise to read them as thumbnails and not absolute statements to be used against you. You could point to writers (Searle? Penrose?) if you like.
Searle, to a zeroth approximation. His claims need some surgical repair, but you can do that surgery without killing the patient. See my original post for some “first aid”.
I’m not sure what you mean by an abstract machine (and please excuse me if that’s a formal term)
I’d certainly regard anything defined within the framework of automata theory as an abstract machine. I’d probably accept substitution of a broader definition.
I would describe myself as a computationalist by default, in that I can’t come up with an ironclad argument against it. So, here are my stabs:
1) I’m not sure what you mean by an abstract machine (and please excuse me if that’s a formal term). Is that a potential or theoretical machine? That’s how I’m reading it. If that’s the case, I would say that CIRJC means both a and b. It’s a computation of an extremely sophisticated algorithm, the way 2 + 2 = 4 is the computation of a “simple” one (that still needs something really big like math to execute).
2) I don’t know if there needs to be a particular class of models; do you mean we know in advance what the particular human consciousness model is? I’d probably say we’d need several models operating in parallel, and that set would be the “human consciousness model”.
3) To me, that just means that a simple state machine took in an input, executed some steps, and provided an output on a screen. There was some change of register positions via electricity.
4) Computing red: here’s where qualia is going to make things messy. In a video game, I don’t have any problem imagine someone issuing a command to a Sim to “move the red box” and the Sim would do so. That’s all computation (I don’t think there’s “really” a Sim or a red box for that matter living in my TV set), but the video game executed what I was picturing in my head via internal qualia. So it seems like there would be an approximation of “computing” red.
5) I don’t have any problem saying the algorithm would be very important. I can put this in completely human terms. A psychopath can perfectly imitate emotions, and enact the exact same behavioral output as someone else in similar circumstances. The internal algorithm, if you will, is extremely different however.
6) I would say this is an emphatic yes. Neurons, for instance, serve as some sort of gate analog.
7) I think it would mention qualia, in as much as people would ask about it (so there would at least be enough of an explanation to explain it away, so to speak).
8) I don’t think computations are conscious in and of themselves. If I’m doing math in notebook, I don’t think the equations are conscious. I don’t think the circuitry of a calculator or a computer are conscious. That said, I don’t think individual cells of my brain are conscious, and if you were to remove portion of a person’s brain (surgery for cancer, for example) that those portions remain conscious, or that person is less conscious by the percentage of tissue removed. Consciousness, to me, may be algorithmically based, but is still the awareness of self, history, etc. that makes humans human. Saying CIRJC doesn’t remove the complexity of the calculation.
I haven’t read that other thread; can I ask what your opinions are? Briefly of course, and while I can’t speak for everyone else, I promise to read them as thumbnails and not absolute statements to be used against you. You could point to writers (Searle? Penrose?) if you like.
Searle, to a zeroth approximation. His claims need some surgical repair, but you can do that surgery without killing the patient. See my original post for some “first aid”.
I’d certainly regard anything defined within the framework of automata theory as an abstract machine. I’d probably accept substitution of a broader definition.