I don’t understand why this example gives different answers. There’s no causality difference, only a knowledge difference. I think we’d need some numbers about Paul’s pre-decision estimate that he’s a psycopath, and the probability that someone who decides to press the button is a psycopath. That is, his prior and posterior beliefs about his own psychopathy.
I’m not much of a CDT apologist—it seems obviously wrong in so many ways. But I’m surprised anew that CDT conflicts with conservation of expected evidence (if some piece of data is expected, it’s already part of your prior and shouldn’t cause an update).
I don’t understand why this example gives different answers. There’s no causality difference, only a knowledge difference. I think we’d need some numbers about Paul’s pre-decision estimate that he’s a psycopath, and the probability that someone who decides to press the button is a psycopath. That is, his prior and posterior beliefs about his own psychopathy.
I’m not much of a CDT apologist—it seems obviously wrong in so many ways. But I’m surprised anew that CDT conflicts with conservation of expected evidence (if some piece of data is expected, it’s already part of your prior and shouldn’t cause an update).