Objectivists, so I understand, say that altruism is a Bad Thing.
The analysis of Objectivism is further complicated by Rand’s act essentialism. As I would characterize her view, it’s the principle of the act, the intent of a policy involved, not the particular consequences that matter.
Just as life wasn’t your living and breathing, but life “qua man”, altruism for her would be an intended policy of sacrificing your values for the values of others, which is just what Comtean altruists suggest as the moral policy.
I care about other people.
Per Rand, your feelings are not the standard of morality. Acting because you feel like it is “whim worshiping subjectivism”, per Rand. Me, I’m a whim worshiping subjectivist, so if you care about people and want to help them, great, knock yourself out. Where I part company with most altruists is on the belief in a duty to be altruistic. I don’t condemn people who aren’t altruistic, but instead have other values they wish to pursue, as long as they aren’t infringing on what I consider to be the rights of others.
Does the Objectivist objection to “altruism”, as you understand it, extend to all instances of the schema in the foregoing paragraph?
You have a prior problem with Rand here. You have not defined a moral code based on principles, but are making ad hoc evaluations of preference. You unprincipled, whim worshiping subjectivist, you.
That is, does it advise me never to let any benefit to others, however great, outweigh any loss to myself, however small?
You’re analyzing in a different schema than she does. You’re analyzing the particular concrete, while she analyzes the “essentials” of the act. The practical answer is no. Sometimes the correct moral code will seem to be a sacrifice of your interests to others in a particular situation. For example, she would be against stealing even when you’re “sure” you will get away with it.
But if your intent is to sacrifice your values to the values of others, if that is the standard by which you judge the morality of the act, then you’re acting on the basis of an evil moral code.
Per Rand, your feelings are not the standard of morality.
I wasn’t suggesting that they are. Per Rand, my feelings are the standard of whether I’m being “altruistic” or not, and my question was about that.
You have a prior problem [...] You have not defined a moral code based on principles, but are making ad hoc evaluations of preference.
I don’t see how you infer from what I wrote that I “have not defined a moral code based on principles”.
if your intent is to sacrifice your values to the values of others, if that is the standard by which you judge [...]
It seems obvious to me (perhaps this makes me a whim-worshipping subjectivist) that neither “always sacrifice your interests to those of others” nor “always sacrifice your interests to those of others” is remotely a sane policy. (I’ve put “interests” in place of your “values” because I don’t think anyone’s really talking about sacrificing values.)
Suppose I propose the following policy: “Consider your own interests and those of others as of equal weight”. Does Rand, and do Objectivists generally, consider that policy “evil”?
What about “Consider your own interests as weighing, so far as one can quantify them, 100x more than those of strangers and some intermediate amount for family, friends, etc.”? Note that living according to this policy will sometimes lead you to act in a way that furthers your own interests less than you could have done in favour of the interests of others; even of strangers.
The analysis of Objectivism is further complicated by Rand’s act essentialism. As I would characterize her view, it’s the principle of the act, the intent of a policy involved, not the particular consequences that matter.
Just as life wasn’t your living and breathing, but life “qua man”, altruism for her would be an intended policy of sacrificing your values for the values of others, which is just what Comtean altruists suggest as the moral policy.
Per Rand, your feelings are not the standard of morality. Acting because you feel like it is “whim worshiping subjectivism”, per Rand. Me, I’m a whim worshiping subjectivist, so if you care about people and want to help them, great, knock yourself out. Where I part company with most altruists is on the belief in a duty to be altruistic. I don’t condemn people who aren’t altruistic, but instead have other values they wish to pursue, as long as they aren’t infringing on what I consider to be the rights of others.
You have a prior problem with Rand here. You have not defined a moral code based on principles, but are making ad hoc evaluations of preference. You unprincipled, whim worshiping subjectivist, you.
You’re analyzing in a different schema than she does. You’re analyzing the particular concrete, while she analyzes the “essentials” of the act. The practical answer is no. Sometimes the correct moral code will seem to be a sacrifice of your interests to others in a particular situation. For example, she would be against stealing even when you’re “sure” you will get away with it.
But if your intent is to sacrifice your values to the values of others, if that is the standard by which you judge the morality of the act, then you’re acting on the basis of an evil moral code.
I wasn’t suggesting that they are. Per Rand, my feelings are the standard of whether I’m being “altruistic” or not, and my question was about that.
I don’t see how you infer from what I wrote that I “have not defined a moral code based on principles”.
It seems obvious to me (perhaps this makes me a whim-worshipping subjectivist) that neither “always sacrifice your interests to those of others” nor “always sacrifice your interests to those of others” is remotely a sane policy. (I’ve put “interests” in place of your “values” because I don’t think anyone’s really talking about sacrificing values.)
Suppose I propose the following policy: “Consider your own interests and those of others as of equal weight”. Does Rand, and do Objectivists generally, consider that policy “evil”?
What about “Consider your own interests as weighing, so far as one can quantify them, 100x more than those of strangers and some intermediate amount for family, friends, etc.”? Note that living according to this policy will sometimes lead you to act in a way that furthers your own interests less than you could have done in favour of the interests of others; even of strangers.